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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW 
The recent rise in subprime mortgage foreclosures threatens to undermine the historic 
homeownership gains made by low-income and minority households during the 1990s. 
Particularly problematic is the fact that the wave of foreclosures sweeping the country is 
concentrated in low-income communities. Foreclosures have devastating financial and 
psychological impacts on borrowers, damaging their credit reputations and ability to se-
cure credit in the future.  
Yet the negative impact of foreclosures extends beyond individual borrowers, lenders, 
and investors. Foreclosed properties often represent an eyesore, a site for illicit activity, 
and a drag on local house prices in vulnerable neighborhoods, and contribute to negative 
perceptions of these places. These factors can, in turn, generate a vicious cycle in which 
the presence of several foreclosed properties in a concentrated geographic area increases 
the likelihood that loans on neighboring properties will be defaulted on as well.  
Obviously, a run-up in foreclosures can impose unanticipated costs on mortgage industry 
participants. For investors and insurers of securities issues, foreclosures represent a direct 
reduction in cash flows and can reduce the market value of their securities. Foreclosure is 
also damaging to servicers, who incur significant expense pursuing and attempting to rec-
tify problem loans. In addition, a servicer’s bottom line deteriorates as the value of ser-
vicing rights must be written down as loans drop out of the pools backing securities is-
sues.  
Funded by the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation and building on the work of 
Neighborhood Housing Services (NHS) of Chicago, this report seeks to chart new ways 
that community-based organizations — working cooperatively with private industry and 
federal, state, and local governments — can develop new national-scale foreclosure pre-
vention initiatives. Through its Home Ownership Preservation Initiative (HOPI), the NHS 
of Chicago has forged a new partnership with the city of Chicago and key lending, in-
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vestment and servicing institutions doing business in the city. The partnership seeks to 
preserve homeownership whenever possible and keep families in their homes through 
pre- and postpurchase counseling, prudent application of loan workouts, and in some 
cases by providing opportunities to refinance into more affordable NHS loans. When 
foreclosure is unavoidable, the partners seek to preserve the vacant properties as 
neighborhood assets.1  
1. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS 
Based on careful review of existing public policy and mortgage industry literature and 
extensive interviews with mortgage industry experts, as well as key government officials 
and leaders of innovative community-based organizations, this report examines how the 
emergence of a highly automated and technologically sophisticated mortgage market has 
helped to promote rapid growth in lending to low-income and low-wealth borrowers. At 
the same time, it documents the troubling rise in foreclosures that threatens to undermine 
decades of efforts to expand homeowner opportunity. In particular, this report seeks:  
!" To explain subprime mortgage securitization, loan servicing business models, and 
other relevant components of the subprime mortgage funding system to interested 
community-development professionals and policymakers; 
!" To better understand the industry’s institutional and legal relationships, examine 
assumptions driving behavior, and test how participants in the process influence 
outcomes low-income and low-wealth communities; 
!" To diagnose issues and create innovative partnership solutions around tools, 
strategies, and business models that serve to better manage mortgage delinquen-
cies and foreclosures in distressed neighborhoods. 
To achieve these goals, this report documents how the rising number of foreclosures 
threatens to undermine the stability of low-income and low-wealth communities. Though 
the rise in foreclosures results from many factors, in part it reflects the adverse conse-
quences of a mortgage origination system that fails to allocate mortgage credit efficiently. 
                                                 
1
 The HOPI initiative will be discussed throughout the report. See Appendix A for a brief summary of the 
goals of this initiative and its accomplishments to date. 
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In addition, subprime securitization, servicing, and disposition of foreclosed assets all too 
often generate negative results. In particular the report documents how:  
Rising Foreclosures Threaten Low-income People and Communities. There can be lit-
tle doubt that foreclosures are on the rise in low-income and low-wealth communities 
across the country. Not only do rising foreclosures threaten already vulnerable people and 
communities, they also call into question whether the recent increase in homeownership 
— built in part on the rapid growth in subprime lending — is sustainable or even desir-
able. Key findings include:  
!" Though hardly in evidence a decade ago, subprime loans are the most default-
prone segment of the market. 
!" Mortgage defaults and foreclosures tend to cluster in low-income and low-wealth 
communities, and threaten to undermine decades of community revitalization ef-
forts. 
!" In the nine target areas served by NHS of Chicago, the foreclosure rate reached 
7.7 percent in 2001 — more than 20 times larger than the national average fore-
closure rate for prime mortgages. 
!" Subprime foreclosures are high and on the rise in communities across the country 
according to detailed studies of the problem in Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, New 
York, and other locations.  
Mortgage Credit is Not Being Allocated Efficiently.
 A home is the largest financial asset 
most consumers purchase in their lifetime, and obtaining mortgage financing represents 
the most significant and complex transaction most consumers ever encounter. Once low-
income and low-wealth borrowers had difficulty gaining access to mortgages of any type. 
Today, mortgages are readily available, but borrowers may become saddled with mort-
gage debt that they cannot sustain. In particular:  
!" Equally creditworthy and otherwise similarly situated borrowers pay differing 
prices to obtain a mortgage of given characteristics and terms. 
!" The rise in the number of mortgage brokers and other third-party originators 
(TPOs) promotes mispricing of mortgages due to incentives to charge borrowers 
as much as possible, while stretching the underwriting rules which lenders and in-
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vestors rely on to price securities. This can result in growing numbers of problem-
atic loans and ultimately contributes to rising foreclosures.  
There Is No Effective Demand-Side Check Due to Consumer Confusion.
 This report 
argues that, lacking effective regulations and recognizing the limited capacity for con-
sumers to shop in today’s complex mortgage market, there is no effective demand-side 
check to the aggressive practices. In particular:  
!" Consumers are ill-equipped to resist the ‘push marketing tactics of mortgage bro-
kers and lenders.  
!" Given the lack of detailed pricing information and the complexity of current 
mortgage products, even the most sophisticated borrowers struggle to be effective 
shoppers for mortgage products.  
Rigidities in the System Hold Back Best Practices. While the emergence of highly 
automated approaches to securitization and servicing have been key to the ‘revolution in 
mortgage finance,’ the subprime mortgage market is still identifying ‘best practices’ that 
effectively address the special challenges posed by higher-risk subprime lending. Ineffi-
ciencies and rigidities in the current system need to be addressed to stem the rising fore-
closures. In particular, this report suggests: 
!" With securitization, most investors are distanced from borrowers, weakening the 
feedback mechanisms that enable investors to sanction poorly performing mort-
gage brokers or practices. 
!" Subprime servicers play a key role in managing the higher risks associated with 
subprime lending, but industry participants — including the rating agencies — are 
in the early stages of discovering what constitutes best practices in subprime ser-
vicing.  
Foreclosure Avoidance, Loan Loss Mitigation and REO Procedures Need Further De-
velopment. Challenged with rapidly rising defaults and foreclosures, many servicers of 
subprime loans are applying best practices developed in the prime market to seek to stem 
the rising tide of subprime defaults and foreclosures, and to more efficiently and effec-
tively dispose of foreclosed properties. While much progress is being made, practices 
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persist that generate outcomes that are not in the best interest of the borrower, the inves-
tor, the neighborhood or society at large. In particular: 
!" The high costs of maintaining contact with distressed borrowers limits the effects 
of standard loan loss mitigation efforts. 
!" In the subprime market, it is very common for delinquent loans to move into fore-
closure without the borrower being made aware in a timely fashion of possible 
loan modifications and workout options, not to mention publicly available fore-
closure avoidance programs. 
!" The disposition of foreclosed assets does not take into account any negative im-
pacts of real estates owned (REO) sales on neighborhood stability.  
2. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Having identified the negative impact that foreclosures can have on borrowers, communi-
ties, and investors alike, the report presents a series of proposed solutions that identify 
various roles that business, government, and community-based nonprofits can play in 
foreclosure avoidance efforts.  
Improved Data Collection Can Enhance Foreclosure Monitoring and Avoidance Ef-
forts. The rapid rise of subprime lending and associated rise in foreclosures has caught 
many off guard. This is due in no small way to the fact that there is surprisingly little data 
on subprime originations, defaults and foreclosures. To help fill this data void, this report 
proposes:  
!" Creation of a national loan origination, performance, default, and foreclosure da-
tabase. 
!" Efforts to identify foreclosure hot spots and to create a series of hot-spot protocols 
designed to enable businesses, governments, and community-based organizations 
to undertake more coordinated and effective efforts to avoid foreclosure.  
!" Expanded research to assess the neighborhood impacts of foreclosure. 
Help Borrowers in Distress. The dramatic increases in subprime foreclosures have high-
lighted the need to help borrowers in distress. Specific proposals include:  
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!" Partnering to increase contact rates that will enhance the ability of subprime loan 
servicers to present distressed borrowers with appropriate loan modifications 
and/or workout plans. 
!" Restructuring regulations that limit servicers’ ability to help borrowers. 
!" Creating programs that better connect borrowers to existing sources of assistance. 
!" Integrating effective credit counseling into loss mitigations strategies. 
!" Identifying and effectively utilizing additional subsidies for foreclosure avoid-
ance. 
!" Helping victims refinance out of predatory loans. 
Make Foreclosures Less Damaging to Neighborhoods. When foreclosure is unavoid-
able, lenders, municipalities and community-based organizations must focus on preserv-
ing the properties for affordable homeownership. This report proposes several new initia-
tives to mitigate the adverse impact of foreclosure on already distressed communities. 
Specific proposals include efforts to:  
!" Eliminate counterproductive regulations. 
!" Create programs to transfer properties to community-based developers. 
!" Develop a queue of loan-ready borrowers that will foster the rapid transfer of 
foreclosed properties to new homebuyers. 
Enhance the Capacity of Mortgage Industry to Respond.
 The rise of subprime defaults 
and foreclosures has surprised many in the private sector, including investors, servicers, 
and the rating agencies. While investors and servicers were obviously aware of the poten-
tial for higher losses in the subprime sector, the magnitude of these potential losses was 
not fully appreciated. As a result, the subprime industry and its investor base have an in-
centive to improve understanding of default and loan failure from the perspective of both 
their bottom lines and their reputations. Specific proposals include efforts to:  
!" Host an industry summit on foreclosure avoidance. 
!" Increase investor accountability to help drive unscrupulous players out of the in-
dustry. 
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!" Work with rating agencies to improve ratings rationale and accuracy. 
!" Disseminate best practices approaches for servicing subprime loans. 
Engineer Foreclosure Out of the System. This report documents how the subprime mar-
ket does not necessarily allocate credit efficiently or fairly. In particular, the market is 
characterized by ‘principal-agent problems’ that serve to siphon off funds that would 
normally accrue to borrowers or investors. Finally, the inability of consumers to shop ef-
fectively for mortgages leaves them vulnerable to abusive lending and enhances the like-
lihood that they will get involved in a default-prone mortgage transaction. Specific pro-
posals in this area include efforts to:  
!" Enhance consumer capacity to shop more wisely and to avoid abusive lending 
practices. 
!" Provide consumers with better information to make more informed mortgage 
choices. 
!" Make use of escrow funds a standard feature of all subprime loans to help bor-
rowers avoid the payment shock associated with property tax payments and other 
lumpy housing-related expenses. 
!" Create a national center to focus attention on foreclosure avoidance activities.  
3. HOW TO READ THIS REPORT 
Following this executive summary and introduction, the report begins with a description 
of national foreclosure trends, and then discusses the findings from a handful of pub-
lished studies examining foreclosures at the city level. It then presents a brief case study 
of foreclosures in NHS of Chicago’s target neighborhoods, and concludes with a discus-
sion of industry and policy issues as well as potential strategies to mitigate the negative 
effects of foreclosure. The remaining sections of the report detail the workings of the 
mortgage industry, paying particular attention to how current industry practices with re-
spect to subprime loan origination, securitization, and servicing may limit the effective 
utilization of foreclosure avoidance tools. These sections are designed for those who 
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would like a thorough understanding of the functioning of primary and secondary mort-
gage market operations.  
Those already familiar with the basic structure of mortgage industry may chose to skim 
or even skip entirely the detailed discussion of industry practices presented in sections 
two to five. All readers, however, are strongly encouraged to carefully review the final 
section of this report — section six. This section presents a series of recommendations to 
improve the capacity for business, government, and community-based organizations 
(CBOs) to respond to the surge in foreclosures that threatens to undermine decades of 
neighborhood revitalization and homeownership expansion efforts, and further threatens 
the stability of already distressed communities. 
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Section 1: SUBPRIME LENDING AND THE RISE OF FORECLOSURES 
An unintended side effect of the ongoing efforts to extend homeownership opportunities 
to less creditworthy consumers is a commensurate increase in foreclosure rates. This out-
come is not surprising given the fact many lower-income and lower-wealth borrowers 
have trouble making timely mortgage payments and are more likely to slip into delin-
quency and default. The fact that much of the recent expansion in homeownership has 
occurred among historically underserved borrower groups has served to concentrate 
homebuying in lower-income neighborhoods with relatively fragile housing markets. 
This coupled with the sometimes aggressive and abusive marketing and origination prac-
tices described in other sections of this report produce geographic concentrations of fore-
closures, potentially giving rise to a ‘contagion’ effect in which foreclosures above some 
threshold level can depress prices in an area and set off a cycle of further foreclosures and 
decline. Recognizing these factors, this section describes the rise in foreclosures in Chi-
cago and communities across the country.  
1.1. NATIONAL TRENDS 
The link between the increase in foreclosures and the growth of subprime lending, while 
not unexpected, is dramatic. Researchers at Freddie Mac estimated that, as of mid-2002, 
the serious delinquency rate for conventional prime loans was 0.55 percent (Cutts and 
VanOrder 2003).2 In contrast, subprime loans had a serious delinquency rate of 10.44 
percent, nearly 20 times higher. Subprime serious delinquency rates were thus more than 
twice those of FHA insured mortgages (4.45 percent), historically the source of many 
foreclosure problems. More risky subprime loan examined by the Freddie Mac research-
ers (labeled in the study as ‘C’ or ‘CC’ loans) had rates topping 21 percent. Though 
hardly in evidence a decade ago, subprime lending has now joined manufactured home 
lending as the most default-prone mortgage segment of the home loan market.  
                                                 
2
 Cutts and VanOrder defined serious delinquency as loans that are already in foreclosure and/or those with 
payments that are 90 days or more late. 
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The success of the subprime segment of the mortgage industry in extending credit to ever 
more risky borrowers has combined with the weak economy to push the national serious 
delinquency rate to its highest level in decades. As shown in Figure 1, Collins, Belsky 
and Case (2003) present estimates of serious delinquency rates by market segment for the 
period 1998 to 2003, showing that the percentage of subprime delinquencies and foreclo-
sures nearly doubled between 1998 and 2001, before falling off slightly. Further, sub-
prime foreclosures are a larger problem today than in 1998 because subprime’s share of 
conventional loan originations now exceeds 5 percent — a 50 percent increase over its 
mid-1998 share. During this period the overall mortgage market grew substantially. As 
noted earlier, higher foreclosures among subprime loans are a natural outgrowth of the 
lower credit quality that characterizes the subprime market. This effect is reinforced by 
the fact that collateral value in the subprime market is generally weaker. 
Figure 1: Trends in Conventional Loan Foreclosure Rates, 1998 to 2003 
 
Source: MBA.
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1.2. FORECLOSURE PROBLEMS FOUND IN MANY CITIES 
While no study has systematically examined foreclosures for a large sample of MSAs, a 
handful of existing studies demonstrate increasing foreclosure rates in low-income com-
munities across the country. While differing in terms of the quality and extent of avail-
able foreclosure data, studies of foreclosure activity in particular metropolitan areas con-
ducted to date, , paint a consistent picture of the rising incidence of foreclosure, espe-
cially in lower-income and minority neighborhoods. This section briefly reviews the re-
sults of these studies. 
A study of Baltimore noted that the number of foreclosures increased from 1,900 in 1995 
to over 5,000 in 1999 and that the growth was particularly pronounced in African Ameri-
can areas (HUD/Treasury 2000). The researchers also found that over a quarter of the 
subprime loans in foreclosure in the first quarter of 2000 were less than a year old and 
over half were less than two years old. In contrast, relatively fewer prime loans entered 
into foreclosure at all, and among those in foreclosure, a relative handful entered into 
foreclosure during the first two years after origination. The fact that so many subprime 
loans were in foreclosure less than two years after origination suggests that many sub-
prime borrowers may not have had the capacity to repay the loan at the time it was made. 
In Atlanta, researchers from Abt Associates examined loans entering foreclosure and 
found that the share of foreclosures attributable to subprime lending increased from 5 
percent in 1996 to 16 percent in 1999 (Abt Associates 2000). Moreover, they noted that 
almost half of the foreclosed subprime loans were ‘high-cost,’ that is they had interest 
rates more than 4 percentage points above the 30-year Treasury rate at the time of origi-
nation. As was true in Baltimore, more than half of these subprime loans went into fore-
closure less than two years after being originated. 
In a study of Boston, researchers noted that subprime originations more than quadrupled 
from 1994 to 1998, with strongest growth in areas with high concentrations of low-
income minorities. They also showed subprime as a growing share of all foreclosures be-
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tween 1995 and 1999, even as aggregate foreclosures declined 30 percent (Gruenstein 
and Herbert 2000). Over the period, subprime foreclosures grew by some 154 percent, to 
account for 11 percent of the total.  
While each study presents useful information on the foreclosure process and the extent to 
which rising foreclosures are linked to the growth of subprime lending or other factors, 
comparison across individual studies is difficult, in large measure because they are based 
on differing, locally generated data and often use differing definitions of key terms, in-
cluding what constitutes a foreclosure or a subprime mortgage. Particularly problematic 
is the lack of consistent data on the characteristics of the borrower and loan in question. 
For example, some studies lack even basic information on loan terms, such as mortgage 
interest rate, and often are unable to determine whether a loan was prime, subprime, or 
FHA or otherwise government-backed. Even so, these studies and the results of others 
not reviewed here document the linkage between the growth of subprime lending and im-
pacts on individuals and low-income communities across the country.  
1.3. CHICAGO FORECLOSURES 
Perhaps the most detailed examination of foreclosure trends was undertaken in Chicago 
by the National Training and Information Center (NTIC). Working collaboratively with 
the NHS of Chicago, NTIC has spearheaded the effort by community-based organizations 
nationwide to draw attention to the growing problem of foreclosures in vulnerable 
neighborhoods.  
In a related report (Collins 2003) for NHS of Chicago, Neighborhood Reinvestment and 
NTIC analyzed foreclosure data available for the Chicago area. According to this study, 
while the foreclosure rate in Chicago stood at 4.7 percent in 2001, in the nine low-income 
neighborhoods served by NHS of Chicago, the foreclosure rate was 7.7 percent.3 Overall, 
some 40 percent of all completed foreclosures in Chicago were in these nine targeted 
                                                 
3
 Collins used 2000 decennial census data to estimate the number of homes with mortgages at the census 
tract level. He then estimated foreclosure rates for Chicago as a whole and for selected Chicago neighbor-
hoods by dividing the number of completed foreclosures by the estimated number of homes with mortgage 
loans outstanding. 
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neighborhoods. Yet, these communities represented only 5 percent of all mortgage origi-
nations in 2001 and account for just 18 percent of the city’s population. 
One of the most compelling, mortgage-related public policy issues today is the fact that 
concentrated foreclosures weaken revitalization efforts and may trigger or exacerbate 
neighborhood decline. Taking a fine-grained approach to the potential for ‘foreclosure 
contagion,’ Collins (2003) finds evidence supporting such a claim in the nine NHS of 
Chicago neighborhoods. He first argues that the timing of foreclosure increases is consis-
tent with the growth of the subprime market. Between 1993 and 2001, foreclosures initi-
ated increased at nearly double the rate (74 percent) of the increase in mortgage lending 
(38 percent). Examining potential causes of the increase, Collins shows that unemploy-
ment in the city was low and home prices were generally rising, indicating that two of the 
most common triggers of default and foreclosure were unlikely to account for the rise. 
Another possible explanation, an increased share and/or deteriorating performance of 
FHA/VA loans, is also not to blame; the number of these loans originated in the city ac-
tually fell by 3 percent, while FHA/VA foreclosures started dropped 25 percent. Finally, 
Collins (2003) shows that for the city as a whole, more than three-quarters of foreclosure 
proceedings initiated in 2001 were on loans with interest rates at least 300 basis points 
above the 30-year Treasury rate in the year they were originated.  
Collins (2003) further shows that whereas the citywide average rate of completed fore-
closures per single-family mortgage was 4.7 percent, six of the nine NHS of Chicago 
neighborhoods had rates exceeding 10 percent, the highest of which was fully 30 percent. 
Many of these apparently end up as vacant units, as indicated by the discrepancy between 
the differing trends in vacancy rates in the area and the rest of the city. Between 1990 and 
2000 vacant units declined 20 percent citywide but increased 8 percent in these nine 
neighborhoods.  
The Collins (2003) study then illuminates the extent of foreclosure concentration by 
mapping the foreclosure pattern in a section of the Auburn/Gresham neighborhood (Fig-
ure 2). Since 1990 the 37 homes on this block have experienced 14 foreclosures, affecting 
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9 separate properties. While not conclusive regarding the existence of a foreclosure ‘con-
tagion’ effect in the way that an econometric study with full controls might be, the results 
of the Collins (2003) analysis are highly suggestive of such an effect and illustrate that, at 
a minimum, foreclosures in some of Chicago’s most fragile neighborhoods have a ten-
dency to cluster. The executive director of NHS of Chicago, Bruce Gottschall, is firmly 
convinced that the phenomenon of foreclosure contagion is a very real one in these 
neighborhoods. He describes the dynamic as one in which “one foreclosure often prompts 
another and another and in no time a decade of neighborhood revitalization work can be 
undone.” 
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Figure 2: Block-Level Foreclosures 
 
The fact that the subprime market accounts for the majority of recent foreclosures need 
not and does not serve as an indictment of the entire industry, but rather as a caution 
about the potential impact of a modest share of poorly underwritten loans, or higher-cost 
loans made with little regard concerning the ability of the borrower to repay. In fact, le-
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gitimate subprime servicers and investors suffer from the contagion dynamic —  as bad 
loans drag down individual borrowers, the rise of foreclosures can negatively influence 
what otherwise would have been successful loans made on nearby properties. Reinforcing 
the possibility for such a dynamic, Bunce and colleagues (2000) found that, while fore-
closures per subprime loan were not higher in low-income neighborhoods than in other 
areas, subprime loans are much more likely in these neighborhoods. The danger to these 
neighborhoods therefore comes from their high concentrations of subprime lending, 
rather than worse loan performance there.  
1.4. FORECLOSURE ISSUES 
The rise in foreclosures raises a number of important policy issues. First and foremost it 
is important to understand the situation confronting low-income and low-wealth house-
holds forced out of their homes. These foreclosures also have a negative impact on the 
bottom lines of mortgage industry participants, including investors and insurers exposed 
to foreclosure-induced losses. Yet it is important to recognize that the cost of rising fore-
closures extend beyond the parties to the mortgage transaction. In particular, foreclosures 
impose additional costs to the owners of other properties in the immediate vicinity of the 
foreclosed property, not to mention public agencies that must deal with the collateral 
damage associated with the clustering of foreclosures in specific areas. In some distressed 
urban neighborhoods that seemed to have turned a corner in the late 1990s, it is not an 
exaggeration to say that concentrated foreclosures threaten to reverse several decades of 
revitalization efforts by local governments, community-based organizations, and private 
industry. 
To understand how best to engage in comprehensive foreclosure avoidance policies, it is 
important that all parties understand both the current strengths and inherent weaknesses 
of today’s highly efficient mortgage market, from origination through securitization, ser-
vicing, and management of default mitigation, foreclosure avoidance and the disposition 
of foreclosed assets. Although the United States has one of the most efficient mortgage 
delivery systems in the world, there is room for improvement. For example, despite ex-
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pectations by some borrowers to the contrary, mortgage brokers and other third-party 
originators neither represent the interest of the borrower, nor do they necessarily repre-
sent the interest of the purchaser or ultimate investor/funder of the loan. This misalign-
ment of interests, in combination with the inherent difficulty individuals have in shopping 
for a product as complex and infrequently purchased as a mortgage, goes a long way to-
ward explaining why efficiencies in the allocation of mortgage capital, not to mention 
abusive practices on behalf of some brokers, persist today. Understanding how to reduce 
the number of ‘bad’ mortgage originations is a key element of an overall program of 
foreclosure reduction.  
But whatever may be done to improve origination of higher risk mortgages, public policy 
must focus on that fact that literally millions of highly default-prone mortgages already 
exist. To best address this reality, it is important to understand how the subprime market 
works, and particularly to consider whether the mortgage industry is well prepared to 
manage the inherent risk associated with subprime lending. This is an evolving area. 
Clearly procedures that worked well in prime mortgage market must be adapted to be ef-
fective in the subprime arena. For example, today there is no clear answer to the question 
about what constitutes the best business model for subprime mortgage servicing. In par-
ticular, the jury is out as to whether third-party servicers have sufficient incentives to ef-
fectively represent the best interests of the investor. Moreover, more needs to be known 
about what alignment of interests should exist to stimulate the creation of better loss 
mitigation, foreclosure avoidance and disposition of REO inventories. And finally, more 
needs to be known about the extent to which the lack of information or inappropriately 
designed regulations limit the capacity of mortgage servicers and investors, working 
alone or in conjunction with city and community-based partners, from engaging in fore-
closure avoidance practices that seemingly could benefit borrower and investor alike. 
The rise of foreclosure raises one final overarching policy issue: should there be limits 
placed on the extent to which borrowers and investors can engage in ever more risky 
lending? Even if a loan is properly priced, and the borrower is fully informed concerning 
the risks associated with the transaction, foreclosures do impose significant ‘external 
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costs’ on others. Whatever regulations emerge governing high-risk lending, it is impor-
tant to remember that the goal of expanding access to capital to low-income and low-
wealth communities is not simply getting people into a home, but enabling them to pur-
chase a home that they can afford to remain in and, ideally, one that can help them build 
long-term assets. A foreclosed home is the American Dream shattered. Now is the time to 
rethink how best to make homebuying a benefit for individual consumers and communi-
ties alike, and not just the start of another costly cycle of deterioration and decline. To 
help in this effort, the report turns to a detailed examination of the subprime lending in-
dustry and uses the lessons learned to form a comprehensive series of proposals to enable 
business, government, and community-based organizations to mitigate the negative im-
pact that foreclosures are now having on both low-income and low-wealth people and 
communities. 
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Section 2: BACKGROUND ON SUBPRIME  
MORTGAGE ORIGINATIONS 
It is impossible to understand foreclosure-related issues without also understanding the 
nature of subprime lending and the process through which loans are originated. While 
purchase-money loans are an increasing share of the total, refinancing remains the core of 
business activity, and most subprime refinance loans involve taking cash out.4 Conse-
quently, from a public-policy perspective a foreclosed subprime loan represents the fail-
ure of a previously homeowning household and often reflects a loss of accumulated eq-
uity for the household. 
A home is the largest financial asset most consumers purchase in their lifetime, and ob-
taining mortgage financing represents the most significant and complex series of transac-
tions that most ever encounter. In addition, unlike simpler and more common consumer 
transactions, a consumer’s decision to finance a home purchase, refinance an existing 
loan, or otherwise access home-secured credit occurs infrequently, giving them limited 
capacity to learn from experience.  
Borrowers also have little information about or appreciation of the likelihood that they 
will default on the loan and risk foreclosure at some future date. Indeed, many consumers 
falsely conclude that being offered a mortgage represents the lender’s assumption that 
they will be able to meet their mortgage obligation. In extending mortgage credit, lenders 
of course consider the extent to which a borrower is likely to default on a loan, but do so 
in order to price this likelihood appropriately so that they or subsequent investors can be 
compensated should the borrower default.  
Equipped with a limited understanding of complexities of mortgage finance, today’s bor-
rower is put at a further disadvantage by a system that is not structured to ensure that he 
or she receives credit on best terms for which he or she qualifies. As explained more fully 
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 One large subprime lender interviewed for this report estimated that 90 percent of the company’s refi-
nance loans involved taking cash out.  
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later in this section, the growing reliance on mortgage brokers and mortgage correspon-
dents weakens or severs normal market linkages through which competitive pressure or-
dinarily ensures efficient pricing. By increasing upfront and monthly carrying costs of the 
loan, mispricing further puts borrowers closer to the margin of failure and reduces the 
cash cushion available in emergencies, thereby increasing the likelihood of default and 
foreclosure. In addition to these market characteristics, a significant number of subprime 
loans are fraudulently or deceptively originated, further boosting foreclosure rates. By 
inflating property appraisals, failing to fully disclose loan terms, or overcharging unsus-
pecting borrowers for home improvements financed with subprime credit, unscrupulous 
originators may reap benefits at the expense of financially unsophisticated borrowers.5  
The structure of the mortgage industry and the growing prominence of third-party origi-
nators (TPOs) enables and reinforces the tendency for abusive practices in some seg-
ments. Unlike investor-originators, TPOs are compensated at the outset of the mortgage 
delivery process, making them less interested in the long-term performance of the loan. 
Moreover, since their fees depend in part on placing the highest-cost mortgage the market 
will bear, they have strong incentives to ‘push market’ higher-cost mortgage products. 
While not all brokers or other TPOs avail themselves of the opportunities to work in op-
position to the best interests of the investor and/or the borrower, evidence suggests that 
all too many do so. While aggressive broker monitoring on the part of reputable whole-
sale lenders, combined with tougher regulation, holds the promise of eliminating broker 
malfeasance, until such monitoring practices are universally deployed, brokers and other 
TPOs will continue to have the opportunity to sell problem loans to those lenders lacking 
the capacity to mount effective monitoring efforts. Moreover, even as a maturing market 
moves to check abusive practices on new loans, billions of dollars worth of problematic 
loans from prior vintages remain in the system and will cause problems for years to 
come. 
                                                 
5
 Unscrupulous behavior by borrowers, also a serious problem, is discussed later in this report. 
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Recognizing the linkage between origination practices and subsequent default and fore-
closure problems, this section provides background on the origination portion of the sub-
prime mortgage market. It begins by briefly tracing the development of subprime lending. 
It then moves to a discussion of issues and trends in originations. Finally, it reviews the 
principal public-policy issues related to subprime lending. 
2.1. EVOLUTION OF THE SUBPRIME ORIGINATIONS INDUSTRY 
While today subprime mortgage lending focuses on home refinancing and, increasingly, 
on home purchase lending (collectively called ‘first-lien mortgages’), the industry 
emerged from the activities of finance companies extending debt consolidation loans, 
home improvement loans, and other types of second mortgages. This initial phase began 
in the 1970s and grew through the 1980s, receiving a boost from the Tax Reform Act of 
1986, which repealed the tax-advantaged status of interest on non-housing consumer 
debt.6 Second-lien home equity lending continued through the 1990s, but most of the ma-
jor finance companies that had led the revolution in credit-sensitive lending were eventu-
ally purchased or ceased operation, and survivors now play a minor role in the market 
relative to refinance and purchase-money lenders (Fortowsky and LaCour-Little 2002). 
The subprime first-mortgage business emerged in the early 1990s as falling interest rates 
made it possible for home-equity lenders to refinance existing high-rate first mortgages 
and allow borrowers to cash out some of their accumulated equity to pay down credit 
card debt or finance other purchases. Instead of needing a second mortgage to pay off 
high-cost debt, borrowers were now able to do so with a single loan that lowered the in-
terest on their primary housing debt and reduced other monthly interest expenses, while 
also converting consumer debt to tax-deductible housing debt. Due to their improved lien 
position (from second or third to first), these first-lien mortgages had lower levels of 
credit risk, broadening their appeal among secondary market investors. The final stage in 
this process, the purchase money subprime mortgage, emerged as industry expertise and 
                                                 
6
 As discussed later in this report, the 1986 tax law changes also contributed to the growth of subprime 
lending by creating Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (REMICs), which helped expand the 
sources of funding for residential lending by streamlining the securitization of mortgage loans. 
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technological advances made it possible to price the combined risk associated with lower 
credit quality of the borrower, reduced down payment, and less certain collateral value of 
the home being financed. 
The advent of risk-based pricing meant that, rather than charging a single rate to all quali-
fied borrowers, the mortgage market sorts borrowers into risk ‘buckets’ based on factors 
such as their demonstrated ability to handle debt repayment, stability of employment, ex-
tent of financial documentation, and loan-to-value ratio. While the sorting algorithms and 
resulting classifications vary among lenders, the buckets for a given lender are typically 
labeled ‘A–,’ ‘B,’ ‘C,’ and ‘D,’ in order from highest to lowest credit quality. Often these 
are referred to in terms of FICO score ranges for each class. Figure 3 shows the share of 
the subprime market for each credit class in 2002. 
Figure 3: Subprime Originations by Credit Class, 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Beginning in the late 1990s, prime lenders began moving heavily into subprime lending, 
a trend enhanced by the enactment of the 1999 Gramm, Leach, Bliley Financial Services 
Modernization Act (GLBA), which fostered the growth and development of large, diver-
sified financial services corporations. For some this involved purchasing leading sub-
Note: FICO scores by crdit class are: A- (>579), B (560-579), C (549-559), D (<549).
Source: Inside B&C Lending Top Subprime Mortgage Players and Key Subprime Data 2002, page 28.
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prime outfits, such as the purchase of The Associates by Citigroup. Other prominent ac-
quisitions included the purchase of Household Finance International by HSBC Holdings 
Plc., The Money Store by First Union, and Long Beach Mortgage by Washington Mu-
tual. Others among the current leading subprime originators, such as Ameriquest, Option 
One, and New Century, grew through a combination of mergers and acquisitions, as well 
by expanding existing operations — so-called organic growth. Some, such as Country-
wide and IndyMac Bank, grew principally by expanding existing operations. Figure 4 
shows the volume and market share of the 10 leading originators, who comprised nearly 
two-thirds of the market in 2002. 
Figure 4: Top Ten Subprime Originators, 2002 
Prime market players were drawn into subprime lending for several reasons. The first was 
their perception that profit opportunities surpassed those in the conforming market where 
commoditization, cutthroat competition, and the GSEs’ market power keep margins tight. 
However, little is known about the profitability of the leading lenders’ foray into sub-
prime lending; some have clearly suffered as a result of their acquisitions. A second mo-
tivation for the move into subprime was the perception that economies of scale could be 
achieved either through larger subprime operations or, especially, if both prime and sub-
prime loans could be originated through a single platform. Few lenders have yet been 
able to fulfill the promise of a unified prime and subprime origination platform, however. 
Explanations for this failure range from the mundane, such as challenges merging soft-
Lender 2002 Volume ($bill.) Market Share (%)
Household Financial Services 20.0 9.4
CitiFinancial 19.5 9.2
Washington Mutual 17.2 8.1
New Century Financial 14.2 6.7
Option One Mortgage 13.2 6.2
Ameriquest Mortgage 12.9 6.1
GMAC-RFC 11.5 5.4
Countrywide Financial 9.4 4.4
First Franklin Financial Corp 9.3 4.3
Wells Fargo Home Mortgage 7.5 3.5
Top 10 Total 134.7 63.3
Market Total 213.0 100%
Source: Inside B&C Lending.
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ware systems, to more fundamental issues concerning the distinctiveness of the two mar-
kets. It remains an open question whether a single-platform model will emerge as domi-
nant.  
Economies of scope in retail financial products and services are a third motivating factor 
for the move into subprime mortgage business by financial services conglomerates. 
(‘Economies of scope’ refers to the ability to sell multiple financial products and services 
to the same client, also known as ‘cross-selling’). Economies of scope are also at work in 
the fact that originations can feed into related mortgage business lines, such as servicing 
and securities issuance, pursued by many subprime originators.  
In addition to these business motivations, banking organizations may have seen subprime 
mortgage lending as a way to generate low- and moderate-income loans that count for 
CRA credit. If these organizations could also show that they were ‘up referring’ borrow-
ers who applied for subprime mortgages but qualified for prime loans, it would improve 
their community commitment in periodic CRA exams. Being perceived by regulators and 
community groups as ‘innovative’ in this regard would go a long way toward managing 
the headline risk associated either with not extending ‘enough’ credit in low- and moder-
ate-income neighborhoods or operating out of subprime shops there. 
2.2. THE CURRENT NATURE OF SUBPRIME ORIGINATIONS 
Broadly, there are currently three ways to originate a mortgage: through a retail outlet; 
through a mortgage banking correspondent; and through a mortgage broker.7 Retail origi-
nations occur through bricks-and-mortar offices, through telemarketing, and over the 
Internet. The key point of distinction is that the borrower interacts directly with the pri-
mary funder of the loan in a transaction involving a retail lender. This funder also estab-
lishes underwriting guidelines defining who should be served and at what price. Corre-
spondent originators also fund loans, often using a ‘warehouse line of credit’ from a lar-
ger lender, but do so with the intention of packaging and selling them as ‘whole loans’ to 
                                                 
7
 For further discussion see Joint Center for Housing Studies, Credit Capital and Communities, a report 
prepared for the Ford Foundation, March 2004. 
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others, who consolidate them for sale to investors and/or for structuring into securities. 
(In theory, correspondents can devise their own underwriting criteria, but these are heav-
ily dependent on the dictates of the purchaser of the loans.) Correspondent lenders sell 
these loans, typically on prearranged terms, for a mortgage delivery fee. They also earn 
any ‘spread’ generated by their ability to sell loans above par value (i.e., for an amount 
that exceeds the initial outstanding mortgage balance).  
Finally, mortgage brokers are independent agents who find customers and match them to 
mortgage underwriting criteria, typically working with multiple lenders in order to ex-
pand their options for qualifying their clients for a loan. The broker’s role is to help the 
borrower prepare the mortgage application and escort him or her to the closing table. At 
closing, the loan is funded by a ‘wholesale lender’ in a process known as ‘table funding.’ 
The sum of broker and correspondent activity is often referred to as ‘wholesale lending’ 
and, as noted earlier, these lenders are often called ‘third-party originators’ or ‘TPOs.’ 
Many organizations that are commonly referred to as ‘subprime lenders’ engage in two, 
or all three, types of lending.  
Both prime and subprime mortgages are originated through each of these three channels. 
Estimates of the market share of each segment tend to be imprecise but generally place 
the retail share between 30 and 40 percent. There is a broad consensus that retail lending 
is less important in the subprime market. Inside Mortgage Finance (2003), for example, 
puts the retail share of 2002 subprime originations at 34 percent, compared with nearly 
41 percent for the prime market.8 The publication estimates that the broker channel ac-
counted for 45 percent of subprime originations, a share fully 50 percent higher than for 
prime mortgages (30 percent).  
TPO originations and especially the broker model are critical to the mortgage industry 
because of the importance of scalability. Because aggregate origination volume is largely 
a function of changes in interest rates and induced by declining interest rates, profitability 
at mortgage originators depends on being able to react quickly to changes in the interest 
                                                 
8
 Mingelgrin and colleagues (2002) put retail share of subprime originations at less than 20 percent. 
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rate environment while also avoiding heavy cost overhangs when volume subsequently 
declines. In this context, the broker model is highly efficient, enabling lenders to quickly 
expand their lending activity while limiting the need to hire additional permanent staff. 
As evidence of the substantial changes in employment that characterize the industry, the 
Mortgage Bankers Association recently projected losses of 65,000 jobs in the mortgage 
industry in 2004. This decline is 15 percent of total industry employment at the peak 
reached in August 2003. 
2.3. CURRENT POLICY ISSUES IN SUBPRIME ORIGINATIONS 
The explosive growth of lending to borrowers with lower credit quality and the impor-
tance of TPOs raise several critical public-policy issues. These stem from inefficiencies 
in the origination process linked to third-party originations, from complexity of existing 
mortgage products, and from the inherent difficulty of effectively shopping the subprime 
mortgage market. In light of the fact that the emphasis of this report is on mortgage de-
linquency, loss mitigation, and foreclosure avoidance, this subsection sheds light on how 
problems at the origination stage lead to subsequent servicing and loss-mitigation issues 
and, ultimately, to default and foreclosure.  
Principal-Agent Problems in Third-Party Originations 
Economists use the term ‘principal-agent’ relationship to describe a situation in which 
one party (the agent) acts on behalf of another (the principal). In these situations, an 
alignment of the interests between the two parties cannot be assumed, even if the princi-
pal compensates the agent for acting on his or her behalf. To the extent that the agent 
continues to have incentives to act in his or her own best interest (which may differ from 
that of the principal), additional mechanisms must be put in place to safeguard the inter-
ests of the principal.  
Several recent papers examine ‘principle-agent’ issues in mortgage lending. Alexander 
and colleagues (2002) identify a principal-agent issue linked to subprime mortgage de-
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fault.9 Using data on fixed-rate loans from an unidentified ‘national subprime mortgage-
lending firm’ for 1996 to 1998, they show that, all else being equal, TPO loans are more 
likely to fail than apparently equivalent retail-originated loans.10 For this to be the case, 
brokers must be aware of information relevant to expected loan performance that they 
withhold from the loan funder in order to slip marginally unqualified applicants through 
cracks in the lender’s underwriting framework.  
The authors explain the discrepancy in defaults by the fact that “TPOs are compensated 
for writing loans, but are not completely held accountable for the subsequent perform-
ance of these loans.” Since mortgage brokers have little long-term interest in loan per-
formance, their economic incentive is to have every borrower qualify for a loan. Further, 
because brokers earn more for selling borrowers loans with higher rates and fees (the 
‘yield spread premium’), to the extent possible they will do so, irrespective of the impli-
cations for the likelihood that the loan will end in default. The repercussions of enhanced 
default probability are absorbed by the funder at the closing table. In contrast, retail lend-
ers who must find a market for their loans have an additional incentive to make sure ap-
plications are filled out correctly, increasing their incentive to accurately evaluate the 
borrower’s repayment ability. 
Alexander and colleagues (2002) show that lenders appear to have diagnosed the agency 
problem midway through the 1996–98 study period and reacted by applying a discount to 
TPO loans of roughly 50 basis points. This response implicitly treats losses caused by 
broker malfeasance as a cost of doing business, rather than an error to be corrected. Such 
a response effectively severs any feedback loop that might be expected to correct the ten-
                                                 
9
 LaCour-Little and Chun (1999) identify a principal-agent problem in the prime market, that TPO loans are 
about three times more likely to prepay than retail loans. They attribute this to the fact that TPOs have little 
or no long-term interest in the performance of the loan. As a result, brokers lack any incentive to avoid en-
couraging customers whose loans they originated for one lender to refinance with another (thereby generat-
ing a new fee from a different lender). In contrast, retail lenders retain a longer term stake in the loans they 
originate either through holding the loan in portfolio, retaining servicing rights on loans packaged and sold 
into the secondary market, holding a claim on the securities it backs, or through concerns for the perform-
ance of their securities among investors. 
10
 Their model of the likelihood of delinquency holds other drivers of default —  such as ability to pay, op-
tion incentives, and loan terms — constant. 
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dency of brokers to slip unqualified borrowers through the system, a tendency underlying 
an unknown but significant share of the elevated subprime foreclosure levels of the last 
several years. In order to avoid undermining the market for securities backed by subprime 
mortgages, issuers compensate for the increased defaults stemming from origination 
problems through pricing on the supply side and credit enhancement on the demand side.  
Lenders also are turning to sophisticated broker monitoring systems to protect their own 
interests and those of their customers. By carefully tracking the performance of loans 
submitted by individual brokers, larger lenders have the capacity to identify and sanction 
brokers who fail to adhere to company policies and procedures. In addition, through a 
series of cross-checks and file audits, the best lenders have the capacity to identify and to 
reject problematic loan applications before they are funded. Unfortunately, these prac-
tices are not universally utilized in the industry. As a result, some brokers will avoid 
submitting questionable loans to those entities utilizing the most sophisticated fraud de-
tection systems and instead simply pass them on to other firms that fail to extensively 
monitor broker behavior. As a result, there remains a tendency in many subprime securi-
ties transactions to simply price for the additional risk associated with broker originated 
loans, rather than correct the conditions that generated the risk in the first place.11 
Allocative Efficiency in Mortgage Originations 
The scope that TPOs have in determining the price paid by the borrower, in combination 
with the fact that the current solutions do relatively little to correct mispricing of mort-
gage credit, has the side effect of causing an apparent lack of ‘allocative efficiency’ in the 
subprime mortgage market. An allocatively efficient mortgage market is one that distrib-
utes the available stock of mortgage credit to its most highly valued uses. By implication, 
equally qualified borrowers should pay the same price for mortgage credit in such a mar-
ket. This condition is widely thought not to occur in the subprime market. Guttentag 
(2001) traces the problem to the compensation structure for broker-originated loans and 
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 The prospectuses for some subprime securities issues note that the individual loans had likelihoods of 
moving to default and foreclosure that in many instances were 10 times as high as prime loans, but that 
such possibilities are accurately reflected in securities prices (Mansfield 2003). 
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presents information on broker profits to substantiate the point. He shows that for the 
subset of conventional prime loans in his dataset that happen to be for $100,000, broker 
profits ranged from $1,077 to $2,748 and had no relationship to the level of effort re-
quired to qualify the borrower (according to the brokers themselves).  
A recent study by Calem, Gillen and Wachter (2002) examining spatial variation in sub-
prime share of all home purchase and refinance lending at the census tract level in Chi-
cago and Philadelphia is also suggestive of allocational inefficiency in mortgage markets. 
The authors model the share of loans that are subprime as a function of borrower charac-
teristics, tract-level characteristics (e.g., education, income, racial/ethnic composition), 
and tract-level risk measures (share of properties in foreclosure, share of individuals with 
low or no credit rating). Most risk-related variables behave as expected, and, importantly, 
race/ethnicity at both the borrower and tract levels remains a significant predictor of the 
distribution of subprime lending. The authors concede that without more being done to 
control for individual characteristics of borrower risk, the results are not conclusive, but 
argue that they are nonetheless highly suggestive of a situation in which factors beyond 
borrower creditworthiness, loan type, and apparent collateral value help explain a portion 
of the price of mortgage credit. If true, this variation in prices paid by applicants present-
ing identical risks is supportive of a lack of allocative efficiency in the mortgage market. 
Another recent paper (Courchane, Surette and Zorn, forthcoming) also finds evidence 
corroborating the existence of allocational inefficiency in the mortgage market. Using 
data from a survey of mortgage borrowers, the study examines whether borrowers are 
‘inappropriately’ channeled into the subprime market segment. The authors do so by 
modeling the likelihood of ending up with a prime or subprime loan as a function of risk 
measures such as FICO score and “borrower self-assessed credit risk factors.”12 The pa-
per confirms that the type of mortgage that borrowers obtain depends in large measure on 
risk-related mortgage underwriting variables (including FICO score, loan-to-value ratio, 
                                                 
12
 For example, the survey gathers data on whether borrowers believe that they “have good credit,” “pay 
bills on time,” and are “in control of their finances.” It also collected data on search behavior and the occur-
rence of adverse life events such as loss of a job. 
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front-end ratio), and other well-known factors such as mortgage type and market channel, 
among others. However, when the authors added measures of market knowledge and 
search behavior, their ability to predict market segment improved significantly.13 They 
conclude that the superior performance of the full model in explaining whether a bor-
rower obtains a prime or subprime loan implies that risk-related factors alone may not 
fully explain why some borrowers end up in the subprime market. Rather, their study 
supports the alternative view that the current mortgage delivery system generates an allo-
cational inefficiency in which households of similar economic, demographic, and credit-
risk characteristics pay different prices for mortgage credit. 
Market Failures in Originations 
Many challenges in subprime mortgage originations derive from an even more funda-
mental problem affecting market participants: the surprising difficulty of effective ‘shop-
ping.’14 Several observers describe in detail the near impossibility of even the most so-
phisticated borrowers shopping for a mortgage effectively (Mansfield 2003, Guttentag 
2001). At best, this may result from the inability of potential borrowers to access infor-
mation that would allow them to determine which product best meets their needs at the 
lowest price. At worst, it implies that some originators seek out financially naïve indi-
viduals incapable of accurately evaluating loan terms. In either case the probability of the 
loan failing escalates, as payment burdens that are higher than necessary keep borrowers 
closer to the margin of failure. 
As a starting point for this discussion, it is important to recognize that shopping for a 
mortgage is especially challenging when compared to shopping for other goods and ser-
vices. In its essence, selecting a mortgage involves comparing discounted present value 
of alternatives over the expected duration of the loan. While a challenging task even for 
the rational consumer posited by the neo-Classical economic framework, the growing 
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 The survey data suggest that subprime borrowers are less knowledgeable about the mortgage process, are 
less likely to search for the best mortgage rates, and are less likely to be offered a choice among alternative 
mortgage terms and instruments.  
14
 In a market where ‘shopping’ is easy, consumers can effectively compare prices for comparable goods 
and services, and sellers are penalized for keeping costs too high by a loss of business.  
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body of literature in behavioral economics indicates that consumers ‘reveal’ differing and 
often inconsistent time preferences depending on how choices are framed.15 In a recent 
paper Shu (2002) argues that given the complexity of the mathematics involved in dis-
counting future payments, borrowers turn to alternative decision-making models, which 
she calls ‘short cut methods.’ For example, a consumer might estimate the total loan 
payments (i.e., number of payments times the payment size) and look for a loan that 
minimizes this amount. Indeed this method would find the loan with the lowest interest 
rate, but only if the term of the loans being compared were held constant. Note that for 
loans with different terms, the one with the lowest total payments may or may not be the 
not be the loan with the lowest annual percentage rate.16 Instead of focusing on APR, 
minimizing the length of the loan term appeared most important for some study partici-
pants, while minimizing monthly payment was emphasized by others.  
The fact that some consumers key in on a particular loan characteristic, such as monthly 
payment, makes them vulnerable to marketing that aggressively highlights that particular 
aspect of a mortgage product. A recent study of subprime refinance borrowers over the 
age of 65 by the AARP Public Policy Institute reveals that, in fact, many borrowers fail to 
search for the best loan available (Walters and Hermanson 2001).17 The survey found that 
some 56 percent of subprime borrowers with broker-originated loans reported that the 
broker initiated contact with them (compared with only 24 percent of borrowers with 
loans originated by a retail lender). Overall a surprisingly large share of borrowers with 
both broker (70 percent) and retail (52 percent) loans “counted on lenders or brokers to 
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 This literature is summarized in Thaler and Cass (2003).  
16
 Shu (2002) shows that the problems associated with deciding what is the best way to borrow money and 
repay over time are not limited to ‘unsophisticated borrowers.’ In experiments using a panel of students 
enrolled in the MBA program at the University of Chicago, she finds that even financially sophisticated 
individuals have trouble determining cost minimizing alternatives for a stream of future payments.  
17
 The AARP study asked borrowers to classify their loan according to three broad categories: loans origi-
nated by a “lender,” by a “mortgage broker,” or by some other means (home improvement contractor or 
other source). Undoubtedly the AARP data reflect the more precise classification of “retail lender” versus 
“third-party originator” deployed elsewhere in this report, but admittedly consumers are often oblivious to 
the formal distinction between a “mortgage broker,” or a “loan correspondent,” since a key aspect of the 
distinction — namely, who actually funds the loan — is difficult for a consumer to discern. 
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find the best mortgage.”18 The AARP study supports the notion advanced by Mansfield 
(2003) and others that in many instances refinance loans are ‘sold not sought’ in that they 
result from extensive and often unsolicited outreach by brokers. 
Survey data presented in a study by researchers at Freddie Mac (Courchane, Surette and 
Zorn, forthcoming) show that subprime borrowers are indeed less knowledgeable about 
the mortgage process than their prime counterparts. In particular, subprime borrowers say 
they are less likely to search for the best mortgage rates, and perhaps as a result were also 
less likely to be offered a choice among alternative mortgage terms and instruments.  
While the AARP and Freddie Mac studies show that subprime borrowers don’t shop, 
Guttentag (2001) claims that given the complexity of the mortgage products, in many 
ways consumers are actually incapable of effective shopping. He argues that “the core 
reason for market failure is that effective shopping for a mortgage is extraordinarily diffi-
cult for even sophisticated borrowers.” Guttentag then presents a detailed discussion of 
the aspects of the mortgage market that constrain the ability of borrowers to shop effec-
tively. These range from product complexity to the tendency for loan terms to change 
constantly and without borrowers having any ability to verify that changes in wholesale 
rates underlying such changes have indeed occurred. Most borrowers also do not appreci-
ate the fact that the length of time before they prepay the loan has a tremendous influence 
on the effective interest rate generated by their point and rate combination. For example, 
the difference between a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage with an interest rate of 6.5 percent 
and 3 points and one at 7.25 percent and no points, while substantial if the loan is held to 
term, is negligible over a five-year time horizon.  
Which loan has the best price that the borrower could potentially negotiate is also ob-
scured from prospective borrowers by ‘rebate pricing’ in which lenders compensate bro-
kers by allowing them to keep some portion of the margin above the wholesale mortgage 
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 The study shows that for those taking out broker loans this confidence was often misplaced, as they were 
more likely to pay points (25 vs. 15 percent) and more likely to have a loan with a prepayment penalty (26 
vs. 12 percent).  
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price. The borrower, therefore, knows from the settlement statement only how much he 
or she will pay the broker but not how much the broker receives from the lender for com-
pleting the deal (the ‘yield spread premium’). This amount increases with the difference 
between the best rate the borrower qualifies for and the actual terms of the loan. In theory 
some of this fee could offset the borrower’s payment to the broker, and the borrower’s 
bargaining position would be greatly enhanced if this information were known to him or 
her. Guttentag (2001) observes that these and other structural features of the current 
mortgage market make it difficult to imagine that consumer education will correct the 
tendency for some brokers to overcharge unsuspecting borrowers.  
Shopping for the best price is made even more difficult due to the fact that mortgage bor-
rowing involves many participants, including loan officers, underwriters and processors, 
property appraisers and insurers, title insurers, credit reporting agencies, mortgage insur-
ers, abstract companies, pest inspectors, and flood insurers, to name a few. In addition to 
the complexity of the product, the complexity of the process provides an opportunity for 
brokers to collude with some of these other participants to skim cash from the borrower. 
Relatedly, the sheer number of documents associated with mortgage lending provides 
ample opportunity for brokers to slip disadvantageous provisions into the loan without 
the borrower’s knowledge.  
Predatory Lending  
Along with expanded credit access, subprime lending has exposed many low-income and 
low-wealth borrowers to abusive practices commonly referred to as predatory lending. 
Predatory origination practices may involve mortgage bankers and brokers, Realtors, ap-
praisers, home improvement contractors, or others involved directly or indirectly in the 
process. Such practices include not only outright deception and fraud, but also include 
efforts to manipulate the borrower through aggressive sales tactics or to exploit their lack 
of understanding of loan terms. The list devised by the HUD/Treasury Joint Task Force 
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on Predatory Lending (1999) based on hearings in five cities19 grouped abusive practices 
into four categories: 
!" Loan Flipping: Refinancing borrower loans repeatedly in a short period of time in 
order to drain or ‘strip’ equity from the borrower’s home by charging excessive 
origination fees each time.  
!" Excessive Fees/Packing: Charging fees well beyond what could be justified on 
economic grounds and including unnecessary and poorly disclosed fees that are 
often added to the loan balance. 
!" Lending Without Regard to Ability to Repay: Lending in which the borrower is 
patently unable to afford the loan but the lender anticipates profiting by selling the 
foreclosed home following default.  
!" Outright Fraud: A range of practices that violate criminal laws (e.g., appraisal 
fraud whereby brokers and appraisers illegally inflate prices by doctoring loan 
application and/or settlement documents). 
Engel and McCoy (2002) note that while abusive lending practices can and do occur in 
all market segments, they are most prevalent in the subprime market. In fact, they subdi-
vide the mortgage market in three distinct segments: the prime market, the ‘legitimate’ 
subprime market, and the predatory market. They argue that predatory lenders target na-
ïve clients — often low-income and low-wealth individuals — who are most vulnerable 
to abusive practices. Such vulnerable borrowers are typically disconnected from other 
credit markets, may be particularly disadvantaged in accessing information about best 
available products, and/or are subject to lingering mortgage market discrimination and 
other social and demographic forces. 
Engel and McCoy (2002) document numerous predatory practices employed to strip the 
borrowers’ home equity, burden them with higher interest rates and fees, or predispose 
them to default by disregarding their ability to repay. The most egregious examples in-
volve unscrupulous real estate agents, mortgage brokers, appraisers, and lenders duping 
unsuspecting borrowers into purchasing a home at inflated prices and/or with significant 
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 Hearings were held in Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York. 
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undisclosed repairs. These practices harm borrowers and their communities, and they also 
impose costs on mortgage investors as most of the loans result in foreclosure. 
Mortgage loans are priced in the secondary market based on assumptions concerning the 
underlying market value of the asset. By reducing true equity in the home (the true mar-
ket value less the amount of the mortgage), an inflated appraisal makes it difficult for a 
borrower to sell the home and repay the mortgage in a time of distress. This, in turn, in-
creases the likelihood that the mortgage will go into default and increases the magnitude 
of losses incurred by the investor and/or mortgage insurer during the foreclosure process. 
2.4. CONCLUSION 
While more aggressive monitoring of brokers and other third-party originators will help 
promote a greater alignment of interest in the marketplace, until such careful monitoring 
becomes universal, it seems likely that the subprime mortgage market will continue to be 
characterized by pricing the additional risk caused by TPO malfeasance, rather than 
eliminating it. Recent history suggests that TPOs will continue to originate mispriced 
loans that will continue to be delivered into the secondary market, and re-priced to reflect 
elevated risk via credit enhancement. As a result, even today the highly competitive sec-
ondary market fails to ensure that mortgage loans are priced to accurately reflect actual 
borrower risk; instead this function falls to regulators and to consumers.  
As elaborated here, however, many consumers are not up to the task. Many consumers 
fail to shop around for mortgages, but instead naïvely believe that brokers will always 
provide them with accurate information. Given the complexity of current mortgage prod-
ucts, even the most sophisticated borrower will find it difficult to evaluate the details of 
the mortgage. Due to the fact that these more sophisticated borrowers have financial or 
legal advisors to guide them, they may have access to better information on mortgage 
pricing and terms. Even if they do not, higher-income borrowers have more extensive 
financial resources to draw upon and hence have greater capacity to bear any excessive 
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costs (for example those required to refinance out of a bad loan) and stave off mortgage 
default. 
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Section 3: BACKGROUND ON SECURITIZATION 
No understanding of mortgage markets is complete without an understanding of the proc-
ess through which mortgage loans are securitized. Reduced to its essence, securitizing 
mortgages is the process of taking individual loans, combining them into a ‘pool,’ and 
then issuing various types of securities whose payments derive from the cash flows gen-
erated by the loans in the pool (Cowan 2003, Singer 2001b). Structuring pools of mort-
gages into securities with a variety of payment schedules and levels of exposure to vari-
ous types of risk has, along with the development of the subprime mortgage market, been 
the most important change in the mortgage industry in the past quarter century, and has 
led to many other substantial changes. This section explains the process and details its 
development, and then discusses the advantages of securitization to investors, lenders, 
and borrowers. 
3.1. DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITIZATION  
Mortgage securitization was devised in the 1970s in response to the fear that the (then 
healthy) thrift industry would not be capable of supplying sufficient capital to meet mort-
gage market demand as the Baby Boomers entered their peak homebuying years (Ranieri 
1996).20 After earlier fits and starts the first widely successful transactions were com-
pleted in the early 1980s, taking pools of existing loans from thrift balance sheets and 
lodging them with Freddie Mac to issue ‘pass-through’ securities based on the cash flow 
from monthly payments on the loans in the pool. The securities carried the agency’s 
guarantee against credit risk (i.e., borrower delinquencies and defaults) and were under-
written by Wall Street firms who sold them to investors. The term ‘pass-through’ reflects 
the fact that both principal and interest paid on the mortgages were ‘passed through’ to 
investors in proportion to their ownership stake in the pool. As the challenges facing 
thrifts mounted through the 1980s, billions of dollars worth of loans in thrift portfolios 
were securitized, along with an ever-growing share of newly originated loans.  
                                                 
20
 The history of securitization presented here is drawn largely from Ranieri (1996) and to a lesser extent 
Brendsel (1996) and Fink (1996). 
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Despite playing an increasingly central role in the nation’s housing finance system, the 
power of securitization to attract capital to the mortgage market remained limited by the 
fact that only 30-year fixed-rate mortgages could be securitized and only into one type of 
security (30-year pass-throughs) existed. In order to broaden the marketplace appeal of 
the product, Wall Street worked with the GSEs to devise new types of securities called 
collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs), which divided or ‘tranched’ cash flows 
from a pool of mortgages into claims of differing lengths and payment periods. When 
issued with Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae guarantee of timely payment of principal and in-
terest, these new securities offered nearly risk-free returns above Treasury Bonds of 
equivalent maturities and were priced at extremely competitive rates relative to invest-
ment alternatives such as corporate bonds. When issued by Ginnie Mae the securities car-
ried the full faith and credit of the U.S. government and again were a competitive alterna-
tive for the investor looking for a return modestly above the U.S. Treasury rate. 
While the financial innovation of varying maturities succeeded in attracting additional 
capital to the mortgage market, several key legal and regulatory impediments restricted 
securitization’s full flowering. Among the most important were state-level restrictions on 
the ability of some investors to purchase pass-throughs and CMOs, limitations on the na-
ture and extent of cash flow tranching imposed by the Department of the Treasury, and 
other tax issues (Ranieri 1996). The first problem was solved through the Secondary 
Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, which used federal powers of preemption to 
make investing in mortgage securities possible for virtually all investors, as long as the 
securities carried ratings from one of the credit rating agencies.  
The second and third problems were dealt with in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which 
created the Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC). The REMIC structure at 
once cleared up lingering tax issues, and gave Wall Street tremendous flexibility to con-
struct securities with widely ranging maturities and previously prohibited characteris-
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tics.21 New securities could now be tailored to meet the maturity, yield, and risk require-
ments of a broader range of institutional investors. These new securities included interest 
only (IO) and principal only (PO) payment ‘strips,’ and variable interest rate securities 
(floaters and inverse floaters). Today’s issues include dozens of classes with an increas-
ing variety of maturity and yield characteristics. The market’s appetite for these products 
is evident from Figure 5, showing the growth in mortgage-backed security (MBS) and 
CMO issuance over the past two decades. 
Figure 5: Agency Securities Have Exploded Since Their Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The successful securitization of conforming mortgages led to the securitization of other 
assets, such as auto loans, credit card receivables, equipment leases, student loans, and 
manufactured home loans. Issues backed by collateral other than conforming mortgages 
are collectively referred to as asset-backed securities (ABS). This includes those backed 
by subprime mortgages, which Wall Street calls Home Equity Lending (HEL), in refer-
                                                 
21
 REMIC status simplifies the legal, regulatory, and accounting obstacles associated with issuing multiple 
asset classes and removes the threat of double taxation at the federal level for a securities issue backed by 
mortgages (Singer 2001b). 
Source: GNMA, FHLMC, FNMA. (Data from The Bond Market Association website 
http://www.bondmarkets.com/Research/statist.shtml)
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ence to the origins of the industry in second-mortgage lending and the continuing domi-
nance of cash-out refinance loans.22  
Figure 6: The Steady Growth of Subprime Mortgage Securitization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Securitization of subprime mortgages has increased steadily as the volume of originations 
has grown. Between 1995 and 2003 the value of home equity securities outstanding in-
creased nearly tenfold, from $33.1 to $313.5 billion. As Figure 6 indicates, in 2002 the 
net increase in securitized loans outstanding was equal to nearly half of the $213 billion 
worth of subprime loans originated. While still dwarfed by the multitrillion dollar agency 
market, subprime mortgage securities (i.e., HEL ABS) are the now the second largest 
share of the $1.6 trillion in ABS outstanding, trailing only credit-card receivables ($402 
billion), and ahead of auto loans ($229 billion). 
3.2. SECURITIZATION’S APPEAL 
Following the inclusion of REMIC provisions in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, mortgage 
securitization evolved rapidly. The process of carving up monolithic cash flows into 
                                                 
22
 The term HEL is sometimes used to include home equity lines of credit, closed-end second liens, and 
high-LTV lending, in addition to first-lien home purchase and home refinance subprime loans. Also some-
what confusingly, Wall Street generally reserves the term MBS for agency pass-throughs and CMO for 
agency multiclass issues. 
Source: The Bond Market Association for securties outstanding.  Inside B&C Lending for Originations.
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payment streams bundled with different levels and types of risk that can be channeled to 
different types of investors has vastly increased the efficiency of the financial system 
relative to the era in which mortgages were funded by deposits and held in portfolio.  
The benefits of securitization accrue because the process allows risk to be isolated and 
reallocated among investors most willing to assume it (Cowan 2003). Most investors in 
MBS and home equity ABS want to be protected from credit risk and, indeed, the credit 
enhancement process renders the majority of investors virtually immune from credit 
events. (A triple A-rated security, for example, is designed to be able to withstand an 
economic event matching the Great Depression in its severity (Taff 2003).) Those willing 
to take on some credit risk can purchase junior securities in varying loss positions. Be-
cause credit events pose minimal problems for most investors, the key source of differen-
tiation among securities derives from prepayment risk, to which they are exposed in vary-
ing degrees over different time periods.  
This is important because the financial system functions much more efficiently and raises 
funds more cheaply when risk is lodged with those best able to carry it. The savings and 
loan crisis, for example, is a case study in risk (of interest rate increases and consequent 
withdrawal of savings deposits) being held by the wrong players (thrifts whose funds 
were largely invested in long-term mortgage assets). When interest rates rose and thrifts’ 
regulated deposit rates could not increase, customers withdrew their money, leaving 
thrifts insufficiently capitalized. This created a substantial asset-liability mismatch result-
ing from the requirement that long-term assets (mortgages) be funded by short-term li-
abilities (demand deposits). The thrift industry was forced into an untenable risk position 
that eventually contributed to its undoing. In contrast, if entities like pension funds can 
hold long-term assets like mortgages to offset relatively distant payment obligations, the 
systemic risk stemming from the asset-liability mismatch that doomed the thrifts can be 
substantially reduced. 
For lenders, securitization conveys several key advantages (Roever 1998). The first of 
these is lower cost of funds. Through the combined effect of the diversification of risk 
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and credit enhancement, an issuer with a non–investment-grade rating is able to raise 
capital at investment-grade rates. A second benefit is that converting loans into securities 
and selling them moves loans off the lender’s balance sheet. Doing so lowers on-balance 
sheet leverage, which improves return on equity (ROE) and other key financial measures 
by which lender health is assessed. A further benefit is the diversification of funding op-
tions. By expanding funding options beyond traditional sources such as deposits and the 
federal discount window, securitization allows funds to be raised regardless of conditions 
in these markets. Finally, securitization involves less public disclosure for the issuer, as 
some of the regulatory attention is diverted to the trust, the structure of the deal, and vi-
ability of the servicer. In addition, issuer disclosure is less than that required for other 
types of SEC-registered securities. 
For borrowers, the promise of securitization is twofold. First, it increases credit access by 
bringing more capital to the mortgage market. It does so by increasing the pool of inves-
tors for whom investing in mortgages is possible and/or desirable and by recycling the 
capital raised by selling securities back through the mortgage market. The second benefit 
is lower mortgage costs. By designing mortgage securities meeting the risk and return 
requirements of a variety of investors, the cost of the capital that funds mortgage loans 
can be reduced. Some share of this reduction is passed on to borrowers. 
3.3. THE STRUCTURE OF SECURITIZATION 
Though the process is complex, securitization is designed simply to create market link-
ages between borrowers and investors (Singer 2001a).23 In order for the process to work 
it must involve a ‘true sale’ of the assets by the issuer to a special-purpose vehicle (SPV), 
which uses funds raised by issuing debt securities to fund the purchase. A true sale is one 
that makes the assets (mortgages) ‘bankruptcy remote’ from the securities issuer.24 That 
                                                 
23
 In doing so securitization avoids traditional but less efficient administrative linkages (i.e., banks, thrifts, 
credit unions).  
24
 Generally a true sale must satisfy the following: it must be a bona fide and arms-length transaction; the 
secured parties are not insiders; the grant of security interest is made for adequate (fair market value) com-
pensation; the intent of the transaction is not fraudulent; and the security agreement conforms to relevant 
laws and regulations (Singer (2001b). 
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is, if the issuer were to fail, its bankruptcy receiver would have no legal basis to ‘attach’ 
or claim the assets backing the securities. In order to avoid double taxation, the SPV is 
typically structured as a trust and, as noted earlier, in the case of residential mortgages 
takes the specific form of a REMIC. 
Figure 7 shows the process of a straightforward non-agency securitization. The structure 
of the diagram with borrowers on one end and investors on the other reflects the fact that 
the purpose of all of the intervening players is to enable the flow of capital from one to 
the other. Below the borrowers are various actors who fund subprime mortgages. Once 
originated, the loans must be assembled into pools, either by the entity that funded them 
or by another secondary mortgage market participant. The entity that pools the loans in 
preparation for structuring their cash flows into securities is called the ‘issuer’ of the se-
curity. Issuers must perform due diligence on the loans in the pool checking for fraud, 
faulty appraisals, violations of underwriting guidelines, and generally ensuring that the 
loans are originated in compliance with applicable federal and state laws and are de-
scribed in a fair and accurate manner. The issuer makes ‘representations and warranties’ 
to this effect in the securities documents. 
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Figure 7: The Securitization Process25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The intensity of the due diligence function differs depending on the source of the loans 
and the origination channel. A retail lender pooling its own loans has devised the under-
writing standards under which the loans are originated by its own employees. Because 
this issuer has controlled the entire production process, it is relatively knowledgeable 
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about the quality and characteristics of the loans in the pool. In such a case, review will 
be limited to a sample of the loans. In contrast, the quality of the loans in a pool assem-
bled by a non-originating issuer that has purchased loans from dozens or hundreds of dif-
ferent brokers will necessarily be uneven.  
In response to the recognition that the interests of third-party loan originators may di-
verge from those of the mortgage wholesaler or ultimate investor, in recent years the 
mortgage wholesalers and issuers have developed increasingly sophisticated technology 
to monitor the loans originated by third parties and to electronically verify some or all 
key data elements used to underwrite individual mortgages included in the pool. For ex-
ample, the issuer could establish that the applicant has provided a valid address and 
phone number for his or her employer using electronic telephone databases. Similarly, 
using automated evaluation tools, some issuers may review the appraised value of the 
collateral backing the loans in a given portfolio. In contrast, other less automated forms 
of review include the verification of the physical condition of the property — performed 
manually and then completed for only a sample of loans, if indeed such a review is done 
at all.  
The fate of loans that do not meet standards set by the issuer varies depending on the con-
tract between the issuer and the originator. Some are assembled into ‘scratch and dent’ 
pools and securitized with more extensive credit enhancements than those used on a typi-
cal deal. Others are rejected by potential purchasers outright or later returned to the origi-
nator. In some cases they are kept in portfolio by the issuer until their performance is 
proven and they can be sold or securitized as seasoned loans.26  
Once the pool is assembled and due diligence performed on the loans, preparations are 
made to transfer them to a SPV. This may be done by the issuer ‘in house’ or with the 
assistance of a separate investment banking organization that structures the cash flows 
into securities with characteristics designed to meet market demand. The investment 
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 Note that not all loan rejections occur due to quality concerns. Some investment-quality loans have char-
acteristics that simply do not meet issuer needs at the time they are offered. 
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banker or underwriter may also guarantee the sale of the securities. The proposed securi-
ties are described in an investor prospectus that provides summary information about the 
underlying loans and details the characteristics of the securities to be issued, including the 
form and extent of credit enhancement to be applied.  
In tandem with bankruptcy remoteness, credit enhancement is what enables investment-
grade debt (triple B minus and above) to be constructed from loans pooled by and/or 
originated by companies without investment-grade ratings themselves or with ratings be-
low those of the securities they issue (Hsu and Mohebbi 2001).27 The level of credit en-
hancement is determined by credit rating agencies (Fitch Ratings, Moody’s, and Standard 
& Poors) based on collateral quality, servicer rating, issuer reputation for due diligence, 
and other factors. According to one rating agency official interviewed for this project, 
collateral is the primary concern. Credit enhancements typically come in one of three 
forms: insurance, overcollateralization, and senior-subordinate structure. Insurance is the 
catchall name for external or third-party credit enhancement provided by bond insurers, 
corporate guarantees, or letters of credit. When employed, the insuring entity guarantees 
that holders of investment-grade tranches will receive their payments irrespective of the 
actual cash flowing into the trust. In exchange, they earn a fee that varies depending on 
the desired rating and the expectation of cash flow interruptions or termination. External 
forms of credit enhancement are generally not favored, however, because the rating of the 
securities becomes dependent on that of the enhancer.28  
The second type of internal credit enhancement, overcollateralization, involves selling 
bonds to investors, the face value of which is less than the total collateral balance of the 
pool (a positive ‘collateral-to-bond balance ratio’). In effect, this structure uses the excess 
collateral as a form of insurance should some of the individual loans default. The excess 
interest generated by the additional collateral can be used in part to accelerate principal 
pay-down. Overcollateralization protects higher-rated bonds against losses, however, by 
                                                 
27
 The issue of credit enhancement is treated in additional detail in Hsu and Mohebbi (2001), from which 
much of the material presented here is drawn. 
28
 Because an insurer cannot guarantee a rating higher than its own, any downgrade in the insurer results in 
an automatic downgrade of the securities, independent of their actual cash flow performance. 
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using the excess spread (interest in addition to what is needed to pay bonds holders and 
cover fees) to maintain cash flows in the event of disruptions and, if necessary, by tap-
ping the excess collateral. 
Senior-subordinated structures provide credit enhancement by prioritizing payments such 
that losses are taken first by one or more junior classes, thus protecting the higher-rated 
senior securities. The level of protection required is determined by the rating agencies as 
a function of the desired ratings of the senior tranches, the characteristics of the collateral 
and the pay-down rules for principal and interest. Securities that are exposed to losses are 
typically referred to as ‘B’ tranches or non–investment-grade securities. Among these, 
securities not in line to take first losses are called ‘mezzanine tranches.’  
Figure 8 illuminates the preceding discussion with a basic example of a securitization en-
hanced through overcollateralization and senior-subordinate structure. At the top are sen-
ior, AAA bonds with little exposure to risk. The value of bonds that can be issued with 
AAA ratings based on the collateral in the pool is determined by the rating agencies. All 
else being equal, having a larger share of the total issue in the highest credit quality is ad-
vantageous to the issuer because these bonds maximize the spread between the interest 
rate on incoming cash flows and that on payments to investors. Lower down in the chart 
are bonds of increasing risk. For example, below the senior bonds are subordinate bonds, 
an overcollateralization layer, and the residual interest in the loans, as discussed above. 
As in this example, most issues employ several types of credit enhancement, with the 
goal of obtaining desired ratings for the securities at the lowest cost. External forms of 
credit enhancements are more often used for issues when new types of assets are securi-
tized, for novel structures whose risk characteristics are not well established, or where the 
issuer itself is new to the marketplace (Hsu and Mohebbi 2001). In such cases it would be 
possible to enhance such issues internally, but this is usually the more expensive route. 
As noted above, the actual level of credit enhancement required is determined by the rat-
ing agencies (Fitch, Moody’s, and S&P). Their decision weighs a number of factors. Like 
the issuer, they evaluate collateral quality. They also factor in the performance of the is-
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suer’s previous bonds, the loss-mitigation strength of the servicer, and balance these 
against the types and ratings of the securities that the issuer proposes to structure out of 
the pool’s cash flow.  
Figure 8: Security Issue with Senior/Subordinated  
and Overcollateralization Credit Enhancements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 7 earlier, once due diligence has been conducted on the pool, lev-
els of enhancement determined, and ratings applied to the securities structured out of pool 
cash flows, the loans are transferred via a true sale to the SPV. In the case of subprime 
mortgages, this SPV is typically a trust structured as a REMIC. At this point the under-
writer has responsibility for placing the securities, either privately or publicly, with inves-
tors. For public issues subsequent trading is done over the counter through market-
making dealers who hold inventories and maintain bid and ask rates for the bonds 
(Cowan 2003).  
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erate cash inflows to match their own prospective cash outflows. Others use mortgage 
securities to hedge other positions, especially around interest-rate risk. Others, such as 
thrifts, may be looking for assets more liquid than their investment alternatives (thrifts 
will often swap whole loans to issuers in exchange for securities based on a pool formed 
from these same loans). MBS and ABS also have different regulatory capital require-
ments than whole loans, making them more attractive to banks and thrifts.29 Most inves-
tors are seeking primarily consistency between expectations and securities’ actual per-
formance, though some are hoping to identify opportunities for above-market returns. 
Some investors are also concerned about the liquidity of the securities, that is, whether or 
not there is a market for them after their initial purchase from the underwriter. 
In many cases, loan servicers will invest in (or retain if they are also the issuer) the riski-
est part of the issue. Though doing so involves taking on risk or ‘having skin in the 
game,’ it also offers several rewards. Most obviously, a servicer holding a first-loss piece 
benefits if pool losses are small relative to the expectations driving the prices of these se-
curities. In addition, investors may prefer that servicers have skin in the game as evidence 
of their commitment to loss mitigation, a commitment that should serve to protect other 
investors in the issue. At the margin, having an invested servicer should make the associ-
ated securities more desirable, as manifested by quicker sales, higher prices, and/or a 
more liquid secondary market.30 
3.4. CONCLUSION 
The advent of mortgage securitization has helped to link mortgage borrowers to interna-
tional capital markets, and in doing so enhanced the liquidity and stability of the mort-
gage market. At the same time, it has added to the overall complexity of the mortgage 
process and raised important policy issues. Unlike a simple transaction between a bor-
                                                 
29
 Regulatory capital requirements for agency securities, for example, are 20 percent of those for whole 
loans. 
30
 Other characteristics that make particular securities desirable to investors include the issuer being com-
mitted to the market long term; issuer performance and market reputation; and a servicer/issuer commit-
ment to fight abusive lending practices (which undermine the quality of investors’ collateral). Some of 
these may be more important to investors than having an invested servicer. 
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rower and lender, securitization adds numerous players to the process, which can make it 
difficult to sort out responsibility when loans go bad. Securitization has also made it dif-
ficult to pursue appropriate corrective actions to address problems in the mortgage indus-
try. The specific mechanics of the securitization in terms of the alignment of risk and in-
centives are extremely important in creating the accountability structure that creates in-
vestor and public benefits. This can be challenging with respect to default and foreclo-
sure, especially in situations where the foreclosure was triggered by mispricing of the 
loans or abusive practices on the part of the originator. As will be discussed in the follow-
ing sections, the details of the securitization process may influence the ability of the ser-
vicer to engage in effective foreclosure-prevention and loan-loss mitigation activities. 
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Section 4: SUBPRIME MORTGAGE SERVICING 
Describing subprime servicing practices succinctly is challenging because there is sub-
stantial variation in the business models employed by the major players and in the role 
servicing plays within these models. Consequently, it is difficult to definitively answer 
fundamental questions such as: Do subprime borrowers need to be serviced differently 
from prime borrowers in order to minimize losses? Are servicers who hold a financial 
interest in the loans they service more effective at loss mitigation? Can the apparent lack 
of alignment of interests between third-party servicers and investors be overcome?  
Servicing managers from some of the nation’s largest subprime servicers interviewed for 
this report gave conflicting answers to these questions. These differing perspectives un-
derscore the heterogeneity of practices co-existing in the marketplace today. They also 
suggest that the subprime market in general, and subprime servicing in particular, have 
yet to fully mature. In the industry, bets are being made on different servicing business 
models — but the winners have not yet been revealed. As one executive explained it, “the 
industry has not yet been through a full loss cycle” that would shed additional light on 
market characteristics and help identify the most effective strategies. 
Recognizing that competing models and practices exist, this section describes the state of 
play in the industry. It focuses first on practices and second on market characteristics. As 
appropriate, it highlights key areas of marketplace uncertainty and of policy interest. 
4.1. SERVICING PRACTICES 
In theory servicing practices should be designed to maximize cash flows from out-
standing loans in order to maintain timely payment of principal and interest for the inves-
tors who put up the cash to fund the mortgages. Barring timely principal and interest 
payments, investors are best served by practices that mitigate losses to the greatest extent 
possible. This is not to say that servicing cannot be borrower-centric but instead to em-
phasize the fact that practices that do not meet the needs of investors who supply the cash 
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to fund mortgages are not sustainable. Fortunately for borrowers, servicers are increas-
ingly focused on solutions for loss-minimizing outcomes. These solutions often involve a 
‘workout’ that keeps the borrower in the home or eases him or her out with a less-than-
devastating impact on credit reputation and reduces the amount of loss that the servicer 
and/or investor must take if a workout can be achieved. However, the complexity of the 
mortgage process may unintentionally create disincentives for the pursuit of loan work-
outs. To the extent that this is happening, it may also serve to obscure abusive practices.  
The Servicer’s Role 
Most of what are typically thought of as servicing functions are performed by the primary 
servicer. This includes ensuring that cash flows reach their appropriate destination (i.e., 
security holders, either directly or by forwarding them to the master servicer or trustee) in 
a timely manner. The servicer is also responsible for escrow administration (though this 
is less of an issue in the subprime market, where escrows are less often required), and for 
investor reporting. The servicer can be the loan originator and/or the securities issuer, but 
need not be either. In cases where the originator sells loans into the secondary market 
with a clause allowing it to continue servicing the loans, servicing rights are said to be 
‘retained’ by the originator. Because servicing produces revenue, all else being equal, 
loans with servicing released sell for more in the secondary market than those where ser-
vicing is retained. Issuers can also service the loans in the pool backing their securities, or 
a third party can be contracted to handle servicing for the issue. As a result, a mortgage 
issuance not only includes the details concerning loan characteristics, but also the servic-
ing requirements associated with the underlying mortgages in the pool. Among other 
elements, these pooling and servicing agreements (P&S) specify when and how servicing 
can or must be transferred in the event that the servicer falters.  
The P&S also specifies the nature of the servicer’s responsibility during delinquency, de-
fault, and foreclosure.31 (Industry divides these into ‘collections,’ which are loans less 
                                                 
31
 The usage of these terms is often imprecise. A loan is technically in default when any of its terms are 
violated. Payment-based default occurs at the point where one payment has been missed and the second one 
comes due — typically the 60-day mark. The date at which foreclosure proceeding can be initiated varies 
from state to state (Cutts and Green 2003).  
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than 30 days past due, and anything more severe, called ‘default management.’) Often the 
primary servicer will be responsible for managing these processes, trying first to cure the 
loans though workouts and, potentially, through modifications, and then handling the 
foreclosure process for loans that cannot be cured. Sometimes these functions are referred 
to a special servicer who excels at dealing with problem loans. The primary servicer may 
also be obligated to advance delinquent principal and interest not received from the bor-
rower, with repayment occurring only if the loan cures or when cash flow from one or 
more sources of credit enhancement is substituted for cash not supplied by the borrower 
(the nature of the servicer’s ‘advance requirements’ are specified in the P&S). Even 
though they are later reimbursed, the opportunity cost of the funds advanced prior to re-
payment usually provides a strong incentive for the servicer to avoid foreclosure. At the 
same time, however, they imply that once loans are deemed unrecoverable, servicers 
should foreclose quickly to minimize losses. 
The P&S typically also specifies a ‘master servicer,’ whose function is to protect the in-
terests of investors by overseeing the actions of the primary servicers and any others in-
volved in the issue and by ensuring timely remittance of funds (Pendley, Tillwitz, and 
Mistretta 2003). Under normal circumstances the master servicer’s duties are modest and, 
according to one of our interviewees, involve compensation on the order of eight basis 
points in the prime market (whereas primary servicing in the subprime market typically is 
on the order of 50 basis points).32 In cases where the primary servicer becomes unable to 
perform its duties, however, the master servicer will be responsible for collecting princi-
pal and interest and ensuring that they are transferred to the appropriate parties in a 
timely manner, either by performing the primary servicer role themselves or by ensuring 
the transition to a ‘back-up servicer.’ Depending on the specifics of the P&S, the master 
servicer may also be required to advance principal and interest to the trustee or investors 
in the event that they are not forthcoming from borrowers. 
                                                 
32
 These servicing fees are approximate and included to provide an estimate of the difference between the 
fees for primary and master servicing. Actual fees vary based on pool characteristics, that is, on the ex-
pected difficulty of servicing the loans. 
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A third class of servicer is the ‘special servicer’ who is responsible for working the more 
difficult, often nonperforming loans, first-payment delinquencies, and/or handling the 
REO process. Special servicer compensation typically reflects the challenges of these 
more difficult loans. A special servicing contract might stipulate bonuses for loans in 
foreclosure proceedings that the servicer returns to cash flowing or to fully cured status, 
and penalties for underperformance. In a report addressing foreclosures it is worth noting 
that to an unknown but presumably substantial extent, the need for the special servicing 
function is driven by the sort of broker malfeasance discussed earlier. Minimally, first-
payment delinquencies (those in which the borrower does not even send in the first 
check) are evidence of a mismatch between underwriting guidelines and the borrower’s 
actual ability to pay, or between the borrower’s and lender’s understanding of the loan 
terms. (They may also be evidence of appraisal fraud, which relies on broker participa-
tion, or of borrower fraud, where repayment was never intended to be made.)  
A final wrinkle in the servicing nomenclature is the subservicer. These participants per-
form much of the primary servicer’s role on a fee basis, but do not actually own the ser-
vicing rights.33 Subservicing and servicing are not mutually exclusive business lines and 
many servicers on both the prime and subprime side do both. 
Performance of the Servicing Function 
Under normal circumstances (i.e., outside of delinquency, default, and foreclosure) ser-
vicing is a fairly routine business — the servicer accepts the monthly payments, notes 
their receipt on the borrower’s account, transfers the payments into accounts of investors 
on a specific day each month, and keeps records of this activity that are periodically pro-
vided to investors and regulators. At the more advanced facilities, the cash-flow mainte-
nance function is technology-intensive, with payment envelopes opened robotically at 
‘lock box’ facilities. The checks and payment coupon are scanned, the checks imaged, 
and in some cases accounts credited electronically. This lock box function can be per-
                                                 
33
 Servicing rights are tradable assets with a strong financial component. All else being equal, interest-rate 
increases raise the value of servicing rights because they slow loan prepayments, thus maintaining a larger 
source of servicing fees. As such, servicing rights are sometimes called servicing ‘strips’ and their interest-
rate behavior is similar to interest-only (IO) MBS and home-equity ABS strips. 
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formed by specialist vendors or run by the servicer. Checks that cannot be read electroni-
cally or for which a problem is detected are reserved and sent for human processing. Be-
cause the servicer earns interest on the float between the day the check is received and the 
day payments to investors are due, they have a strong incentive to streamline the payment 
posting process. Efficient practices also benefit the servicer through cost savings relative 
to manual processing and by avoiding the headline risk that comes with being perceived 
as trying to artificially generate revenue from late fees. The competing incentive to delay 
posting in order to collect a fee from borrowers or to trigger extra servicing fees for de-
linquencies also exists, but may be waning due to increased regulatory scrutiny deriving 
from the high-profile Fairbanks case (described in depth on page 59).  
The technologically intensive nature of the servicing business is not limited to payment 
posting. Servicers employ ‘early detection’ software systems that track payment patterns 
for each loan in their portfolio and look for anomalies. In fact, servicers can carefully 
monitor late payments because they are able to track payment envelopes as soon as they 
have entered the postal system. This is possible due to the bar coding of remittance enve-
lopes and the Postal Service’s computerized mail processing.  
Because of the frequency of delinquency in the subprime market, some servicers go to 
great lengths to establish a relationship with their borrowers. This improves the likeli-
hood of a successful contact should the servicer detect a problem. The effort to establish 
lines of communication with subprime borrowers includes sending initial welcome packs 
with the servicer’s contact information (one company sends coffee mugs) and materials 
encouraging the borrower to call at the earliest sign of trouble. Many servicers also make 
welcome calls designed to establish contact and to implant the message that borrowers 
should contact them at the first sign of trouble. In contrast, however, one interviewee de-
scribed such early-and-often contact methods as “pestering the borrower.” 
Software packages called ‘scoring tools’ are employed to help the servicer navigate the 
delinquency process with each borrower. As noted earlier, industry practice divides 
missed payments into ‘collections’ and ‘default management’ phases. Freddie Mac’s Ear-
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lyIndicator and Fannie Mae’s Risk Profiler are systems designed to manage these aspects 
of the process in the conforming market.34 EarlyIndicator scores collections accounts 
from 000 to 099 based on past payment history, credit rating, and other factors. Higher 
scores are more likely to cure before reaching thirty days past due (DPD). These scores 
are used to structure staff time more efficiently and to queue automated dialers for collec-
tions campaigns (Freddie Mac 2000).  
Figure 9: Performance Improves with EarlyIndicator Scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EarlyIndicator ranks loans more than 30 DPD from 101 through 400, with higher scores 
less likely to reach foreclosure. Based on these scores, servicing interventions such as 
attempting first contact, sending a foreclosure alternative letter, and initiating foreclosure 
proceedings are timed for different points in the delinquency cycle. For example, Early-
                                                 
34
 Though the GSEs have recalibrated them for use in the subprime market, these software tools are used 
primarily in the conforming market. Deployment among subprime servicers is limited and industry percep-
tions as revealed in our interviews were not positive about current performance. The discussion here none-
theless focuses on Freddie Mac’s product tools because information is publicly available and because the 
function they are designed to perform is the same as that of subprime-oriented systems. 
Source: Cordell (2000).
Note: Loans scored 12/1996 with performance through 7/2000.
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Indicator
 recommends initiating foreclosure proceedings by 90 DPD for those with 
scores between 101 and 360 but waiting until day 120 for those with scores above 360. 
As shown in Figure 9, loans scored more highly do indeed encounter fewer problems.  
Predatory Servicing  
The notion of ‘predatory servicing’ now rivals ‘predatory lending’ as a concern of regula-
tors, community advocates and mortgage industry officials alike. This new term is gener-
ally reserved for the subprime market and refers to unfair, deceptive, and illegal practices 
that harm borrowers’ financial interests, especially in cases where their ability to remain 
in the home is affected. The most egregious accusation is that some servicers or ser-
vicer/investors ‘profit from foreclosures,’ though industry unanimously decries this 
claim. The recent settlement between the FTC and the largest subprime servicer, Fair-
banks Capital Corp., has given weight to concerns over the fact that, for actors with sub-
stantial power to determine subprime borrowers’ outcomes, servicers face little regula-
tory oversight, a concern compounded by the fact that borrowers cannot choose who ser-
vices their loan.35  
The Fairbanks settlement is a good place to begin looking at what might constitute preda-
tory servicing. The company was accused of violating four federal statutes: the FTC Act, 
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 
and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA). Specifically, the FTC alleged 
that Fairbanks did the following (FTC 2003). 
!" Failed to post consumers’ mortgage payments in a timely and proper manner, and 
then charged late fees or additional interest for failing to make payments ‘on 
time.’ 
!" Charged consumers for placing casualty insurance on their loans when insurance 
was already in place (‘force-placing of insurance’). 
!" Assessed and collected improper or unwarranted fees, such as late fees, delin-
quency fees, attorney’s fees, and other fees. 
                                                 
35
 Consumer Web sites contain tales of borrowers refinancing loans for the sole purpose of changing ser-
vicers. 
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!" Misrepresented the amounts consumers owed. 
In the recently announced settlement, Fairbanks agreed to cease these practices, abide by 
relevant legislation, and pay $40 million to address complaints and reimburse consumers.  
While the suite of practices described in the settlement indeed sounds abusive, several 
industry insiders interviewed for this report voiced the opinion that, though the company 
undoubtedly made mistakes, Fairbanks was less an intentional purveyor of inappropriate 
practices and more a firm unable to manage the volume of work it had taken on. (Fair-
banks’ subprime portfolio more than tripled from $14.1 to $49.3 billion from 2001 to 
2002 as the company bought the servicing rights to Bank of America’s subprime portfo-
lio and its EquiCredit subprime mortgage servicer.) The language of the settlement to 
some extent supports this interpretation. For example, in the settlement documents, Fair-
banks is admonished to “take reasonable actions” to determine whether customers have 
casualty insurance (presumably a properly functioning servicer would know this informa-
tion) or to perform several functions “in a timely manner.” 
Subprime servicers are naturally concerned that the Fairbanks settlement reflects poorly 
on the entire industry.36 Based on the interviews conducted for this study, industry per-
ception of the predatory servicing issue can be summed up in four parts. First, while in-
appropriate practices have occurred, officials assert that they were never pervasive and 
are waning where they exist. Second, much of what is being labeled predatory servicing 
is, in fact, ‘bad servicing,’ as illustrated by the Fairbanks debacle, which occurred after its 
growth outpaced the ability of its internal systems and staff to manage. Third, where they 
do or did exist, problematic servicing practices are generally not nearly as severe or en-
trenched as those in originations. (One interviewee highlighted the qualitatively different 
financial impact of improper payment posting and equity stripping.) Finally, to the extent 
that problematic servicing practices are still occurring, they lend themselves to straight-
forward solutions, unlike problems on the origination side where disagreement still re-
                                                 
36
 They also worry that state-level predatory servicing laws, such as those already enacted as part of anti–
predatory-lending laws in New Jersey, New Mexico, and Illinois, will bring additional and unnecessary 
complexity to the servicing business. 
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mains as to what constitutes a bad loan or abusive practice, and the answer may in fact 
vary depending on the circumstances.  
In an expression of the changing climate in the servicing industry, the general counsel for 
one company commented that “there is currently no tolerance for the servicer also pro-
viding ancillary services and charging for it,” noting that some third-party servicers had 
used this to increase revenues in the past “so now it’s under the microscope.” Some ser-
vicers continue to cross-sell ‘add-ons,’ claiming that because of their bulk purchasing 
power they can provide these additional services at a lower price than the customer could 
obtain on his or her own. Even so, this respondent explained that due to allegations about 
predatory servicing he forbids his company from providing any ancillary services even if 
they can do so at a cost savings to the borrower relative to other third-party vendors of 
the service. 
Whatever the industry view, many groups that once focused exclusively on ‘predatory 
lenders’ have begun to focus on alleged ‘predatory servicing.’ These efforts are fueled by 
cases where homes have been lost not due to failure to pay principal and interest, but to 
an inability to keep up with fees charged by aggressive servicers. Alleging that Fairbanks 
had been misapplying fees, withholding payments, and charging unnecessary fees, Na-
tional People’s Action (NPA), a grassroots coalition of community affiliates coordinated 
by NTIC, has mounted a multistate campaign to pressure Fairbanks to provide compensa-
tion to abused families. As part of this campaign, for example, the NPA Des Moines af-
filiate has enlisted the attorney general’s office to help in their efforts to get Fairbanks to 
compensate victims. In Syracuse, New York, the NPA affiliate recently mounted a cam-
paign to persuade one bank to remove Fairbanks as its loan servicer. Undoubtedly, this 
coordinated advocacy campaign contributed to the willingness of Fairbanks to enter into 
the settlement with the FTC (see NTIC 2003).  
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4.2. SUBPRIME SERVICING: MARKET CHARACTERISTICS 
As noted at several places in this report, mortgage servicing is a relatively consolidated 
industry. This subsection examines the pattern of consolidation, the factors driving the 
process, and compares the level of consolidation in servicing to that in originations.  
Figure 10: Top 25 Subprime Servicers, 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown in Figure 10, the top 25 mortgage subprime servicers account for nearly three-
quarters of the market, up from less than one-third six years ago. Today’s largest sub-
prime servicers are a mixed bag of subsidiaries of major financial conglomerates, such as 
Servicer 2002 Volume ($bill.)
Market Share 
(%)
Fairbanks Capital Corp 49.3 8.6
CitiFinancial Mortgage 47.3 8.2
Household Financial Services 46.3 8.1
Ocwen Financial Corp 30.4 5.3
Option One Mortgage 28.1 4.9
Homecomings (GMAC-RFC) 27.4 4.8
Countrywide Financial 25.2 4.4
Ameriquest Mortgage 17.0 3.0
HomEq Servcing Corp 16.7 2.9
Chase Home Finance 16.2 2.8
Washington Mutual 14.5 2.5
National City Home Loan Services 11.3 2.0
Litton Loan Services 10.8 1.9
American General Finance 9.5 1.7
Conseco Finance Corp 8.8 1.5
PCFS Financial Services 7.8 1.4
Saxon Mortgage 7.6 1.3
Wendover Financial Services Corp 6.3 1.1
Wells Fargo Home Mortgage 6.1 1.1
EMC Mortgage Corp 6.0 1.0
Centex Hoem Equity Corp 5.2 0.9
Key National Home Equity 5.1 0.9
IndyMac Bank 5.0 0.9
Equity One Mortgage 4.4 0.8
Wilshire Credit 3.7 0.6
Top 25 Total 416.0 72.4
Market Total 574.2 100.0
Source: Inside B&C Lending.
Preserving Homeownership: Community-Development Implications of the New Mortgage Market 
 63 
Citigroup and HSBC, and firms specializing in subprime. Two of the largest, Ocwen Fi-
nancial and Fairbanks Capital, are third-party servicers who neither originate their own 
loans nor hold a financial interest in the securities they service. Others are large subprime 
specialist firms such as Ameriquest, Option One, and New Century. The top 25 are listed 
with their portfolio volume and market share in Figure 10. Collectively, these organiza-
tions service 72 percent of the $574 billion in B and C loans outstanding (Inside Mort-
gage Finance
 2003). 
Few studies have examined the factors supporting consolidation in the servicing industry 
and none has looked at the subprime segment exclusively. More than a decade ago Fol-
lain and Zorn (1990) predicted that the unbundling of traditional thrift functions, includ-
ing servicing, in response to regulatory changes in the 1980s would lead to increased 
‘specialization’ of these functions in the overall mortgage market. They further noted 
that, after holding steady at around 11 percent between 1974 and 1979, the share of loans 
handled by the top 100 servicers had increased to 20 percent by 1988. The authors also 
commented on the “striking” level of consolidation apparent by 1989, when the top fif-
teen servicers handled 16 percent of the $2 billion outstanding.  
Interestingly, Follain and Zorn (1990) were unsure about the impact of economies of 
scale on specialization or consolidation among servicers. This issue is addressed by Rossi 
(1998) in a study examining the costs structure of the mortgage banking industry de-
signed to evaluate future consolidation trends in origination and servicing. He notes that 
an earlier study by the Mortgage Bankers Association showed servicing costs at mortgage 
banking operations with less than 5,000 loans were double those of mortgage banks with 
more than 70,000 loans. Using 1990 to 1992 balance sheet and income statement data 
from mortgage banks, Rossi finds that substantial economies of scale in servicing exist 
even at the highest output sizes. He claims that servicing is particularly amenable to scale 
economies because of the extent to which its requirements can be automated and involve 
information sharing. Rossi (1998) concludes that as of the early 1990s mortgage banking 
was an industry characterized not only by scale economies but also by declining costs due 
primarily to servicing.  
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Servicing has also been targeted as an industry destined for extreme consolidation due to 
technological advances that have unleashed economies of scale in a business based on 
information processing. In the mortgage market as a whole, the top five organizations 
now service almost 40 percent of all loans, compared to 10 percent a decade ago (Cutts 
and Green 2003). The subprime market has not reached this degree of consolidation, 
however. In part, this could reflect the fact that the subprime market itself is relatively 
young, and has yet to realize fully the potential cost reductions linked to scale economies. 
Alternatively, lack of consolidation could indicate a difference in borrower characteristics 
that make subprime servicing less conducive to consolidation. In the words of one servic-
ing executive, “subprime servicing is not a scale business.” 
Going forward, industry is bracing for continued consolidation. One of the most widely 
quoted statements in the mortgage industry, made by both Angelo Mozillio and Kerry 
Killinger, who head two of the institutions expected to prevail in this battle (Countrywide 
and Washington Mutual, respectively), is that in five years’ time only five major ser-
vicers will remain. Industry characteristics such as information intensiveness and the fact 
that technology can be applied to beneficial effect in nearly every aspect of the business 
seem to support such claims. The up-front costs of software systems and call centers each 
point to increasing inability of smaller players to compete. Further, competitive advan-
tage is now and will increasingly be a function of having the most efficient cash man-
agement techniques, such as high-tech lock boxes that almost instantaneously deposit 
borrower funds.  
4.3. ARE SUBPRIME BORROWERS DIFFERENT? 
The subprime servicing is still in its infancy, with major players still competing for mar-
ket dominance, and in doing so often employing fundamentally different business models 
to guide their efforts. One question that continues to divide the industry is whether there 
are meaningful differences between prime and subprime borrowers. While some industry 
experts interviewed for this report stressed that the differences were pronounced, others 
contend that the differences between subprime and prime borrowers were simply a matter 
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of degree. In any event, to the extent that such differences exist, they imply different lev-
els of success for different servicing approaches in each market. 
Evaluating evidence for the claim that prime and subprime borrowers are different re-
veals that prime borrowers, in addition to having superior credit backgrounds, tend to 
have larger cash reserves and more stable employment histories than subprime borrowers. 
They may also have greater sources of emergency cash, such as friends and relatives with 
funds available to help them overcome a temporary financial hardship. In combination, 
these features make prime borrowers unlikely to become delinquent or to default on their 
loans. As Figure 11 shows, serious delinquencies rise steadily as credit quality declines. 
The same is true for defaults.  
Figure 11: Likelihood of Delinquency and Default by Credit Quality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prime borrowers’ more robust position vis-à-vis delinquency and default suggests that the 
appropriate servicing model for them is one in which the servicer initiates foreclose pro-
ceedings as quickly as possible once significant trouble is detected. Typically, prime bor-
rowers are more likely to cure a delinquency if they have the desire to remain in the home 
because of additional resources available to them as compared to subprime borrowers. 
Therefore, loans that become severely delinquent are typically cases where the borrower 
has given up trying to save the loan. Following a divorce, for example, neither spouse 
FHA Total
Conforming Jumbo
Share of All Mortgages (%) 59.95 22.34 9.43 91.75
Serious Delinquency Rate (%) 0.94 5.31 6.40 2.23
AA+ AA A B C CC Total
Share of All Mortgages (%) 0.47 3.42 1.94 0.87 0.66 0.89 8.25
Serious Delinquency Rate (%) 7.70 16.60 22.50 32.60 39.70 43.60 23.80
Notes: Share of mortgages based on 2001 dollar volume of originations. Serious delinquency rate based on Freddie Mac experience for loans originated  in 2000;
FHA serious delinquency rate from Feshbach (2002) for loans originated in 2000, Jumbo serious delinquency rates average over all current years  and are from 
Loan Performance (2002); subprime performance from Option One Mortgage Corp (2002).
Source: Cutts and Van Order (2003).
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may have an interest in remaining in a home with little equity. In such a situation, accel-
erating the foreclosure process is the best option for the lender.  
The extent to which prime and subprime loans differ with respect to market value of the 
homes that serve as collateral introduces another source of variation in servicing. Com-
pared to prime loans, subprime loans are far more common in marginal neighborhood 
where foreclosing may not net the lender sufficient value to justify the cost of the proc-
ess. 
Those arguing that subprime borrowers are different also point out that thin cash cushions 
and more frequent employment gaps make delinquency a structural aspect of subprime 
payment streams. (One servicing manager estimated that one in four subprime borrowers 
becomes delinquent at some point.) Borrowers facing a three-month layoff may be unable 
to pay during that period but able and eager to begin paying again when they are rehired. 
At this point the loan is severely delinquent but, unlike in the prime market, the severe 
delinquency does not reflect the borrower’s unwillingness to make the loan work, but 
rather the inability to pay off arrears.  
An additional potential difference relates to the greater prevalence of inappropriately 
originated loans in the subprime market. To the extent that broker malfeasance produces 
loans for which borrowers are marginally qualified, delinquencies and defaults will also 
be higher, and servicing will be more challenging. A further source of difference is sug-
gested by Cutts and Van Order (2003), who hypothesize that subprime borrowers may be 
more likely to ‘borrow’ from the noteholder by deliberately not paying their loan for a 
month or two in order to address other financial concerns. When they come current a few 
months later they take the penalty for doing so as an interest payment on what amounts to 
a short-term loan. 
Extrapolating from these characteristics implies a very different and higher-cost servicing 
model that potentially requires increased human contact and hence reduced scope for 
economies of scale to operate. Subprime collateral is also likely to be weaker because it 
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tends more often to be located in marginal neighborhoods and because the subprime 
homeowner may have fewer resources available to maintain the home’s quality. In addi-
tion, subprime loans tend to be smaller and the homes less expensive, meaning that less 
equity is typically available to reward the effort and expense of going through foreclo-
sure. Further, as the preceding paragraph suggests, even fairly severe delinquencies are 
not necessarily indicative of the subprime borrower’s lack of willingness to remain in the 
home. Given the high cost of foreclosure it is therefore almost always in the interest of 
the investor to employ a workout if the delinquent borrower has the ability and willing-
ness to do so.  
Another key issue is the servicer’s differing incentive for pursuing loss mitigation in the 
prime and subprime markets. Cutts (2003a: 2) claims that servicers in the conforming 
market are very price-conscious because they are compensated by “a flat servicing fee 
with fee/bonus incentives from investors for achieving low incidences of default. Thus 
any change in practice that streamlines processes, reduces the incidence of foreclosure 
and REO, or increases the cure rate on delinquent loans will result in a direct increase in 
profitability for the servicer.” In the subprime market, however, third-party servicing is 
less common and servicers are more often in line to take the first losses due to default and 
delinquency (referred to in the servicing industry as having ‘skin in the game’).  
This investor/servicer role may provide stronger incentives to avoid foreclosures than do 
the bonus fees and provide the potential for obtaining superior results for other investors 
participating in the transaction. Said one official from a major subprime issuer/servicing 
organization “the fact that we have our own money on the line should a pool of subprime 
loans experience unexpectedly higher rates of foreclosure helps us to market our securi-
ties to other investors. We believe, and have put substantial amounts of our own money at 
risk in support of this proposition, that with greater attention to customer service, and our 
efforts to promote good customer relations, we can reach borrowers in distress sooner, 
and help them to get back on track and avoid costly foreclosures. Time will tell if we are 
right, but our growth in profitability and market share suggests that we are moving in the 
right direction.”  
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Because risk levels are less well established in the subprime market and because the risk 
of credit losses is higher, potential returns to the residual-holder from minimizing credit 
losses are much larger on a subprime than a prime securities issue. Therefore, subprime 
servicers holding residual risk can devote additional effort to foreclosure avoidance and 
loss mitigation beyond what would be economic in the prime market, with the expecta-
tion of making it up via improved performance of the residual interest in the securities 
they hold. This is true even in comparison to a prime market servicer holding a residual 
interest in a loan pool because the payoff for success is larger in the subprime market to 
compensate for the demonstrably higher credit risk of the borrowers. 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
Servicing approaches in the subprime mortgage market are still being developed, tested, 
and perfected. Competing servicing models exist side by side in the marketplace, as the 
industry seeks to better understand what servicing best practices can be simply trans-
ferred from the prime mortgage sector, and what practices must be adapted to reflect the 
differences associated with subprime borrowers, subprime loan products, and the 
neighborhoods in which they are typically located. To date, while no approach is domi-
nant, most industry participants recognize that the enormous opportunities for loss reduc-
tion exist during the servicing process. Sustained lower loss rates will translate directly 
into increased profitability for issuers by reducing credit enhancement requirements 
and/or by allowing securities constructed from the same pool of loans to be sold for 
higher price. Fortunately this market incentive should also work to improve outcomes for 
subprime borrowers. Lacking clear answers to many basic questions, now is the time for 
interested parties — industry, governments, and community-based players alike — to ex-
plore the potential for collaborative solutions to mitigate the substantial costs associated 
with the unexpectedly high level of foreclosures affecting many low-income communi-
ties. 
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Section 5: DISPOSITION OF FAILED LOANS: WORKOUTS,  
WRITE-OFFS, FORECLOSURE, AND REO 
While innovative and appropriately aggressive servicing and collection efforts can help 
many borrowers avoid and recover from severe repayment problems, default and foreclo-
sure are structural aspects of the mortgage market. Indeed, some level of foreclosure is 
unavoidable even in lending to the best credit risks. Because foreclosure is typically the 
worst outcome not just for borrowers but for investors as well, expanding credit access to 
less creditworthy borrowers has challenged the mortgage servicing industry to create new 
and enhanced foreclosure avoidance tools, with varying degrees of success. In the event 
that efforts to mitigate the financial impact of failed loans do not succeed, servicers often 
are left with the difficult task of disposing of the collateral backing the failed loans. Do-
ing so in a manner that minimizes investor losses is far from an easy or straightforward 
process. 
This section discusses this final stage of the servicing process, as well as the impact that 
the current structure of mortgage securitizations may have on the ability of servicers to 
engage in foreclosure avoidance and effective property disposition efforts that are consis-
tent with limiting negative effects of foreclosure on the neighborhoods in which they oc-
cur.  
5.1. ALTERNATIVES FOR BORROWERS IN TROUBLE 
One of the most important functions performed by the servicer is to offer delinquent bor-
rowers workout options that avoid foreclosure while also minimizing investor losses. A 
study of prime mortgage foreclosures by the Tower Group (Focardi 2002) highlights the 
fact that under most circumstance both sides have a strong incentive to avoid foreclosure 
if possible. The study finds that the average foreclosure takes eighteen months to com-
plete at a cost of nearly $58,000. For the borrower, the obvious advantages of foreclosure 
avoidance include minimizing damage to credit histories and, in a surprising number of 
cases, the ability to remain in the home.  
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The term workout is often used to refer to any action by the servicer that sanctions a 
payment pattern different from that laid out in the original loan documents. Servicers 
speak of the difference between ‘mods’ (i.e., modifications) and ‘plans,’ with the former 
involving permanent legal changes to the terms of the loan and the latter being shorter-
term solutions typically lasting less than one year.  
While no strictly agreed upon typology of workouts exist, Cutts and Green (2003) offer a 
typology that divides them into home retention and voluntary title transfer alternatives. 
Home retention workout options include partial reinstatement, short-term forbearance, 
long-term forbearance, and loan modification. Partial reinstatement occurs when a bor-
rower who has become delinquent begins paying again and agrees to a plan to repay ar-
rears in twelve months or less. Forbearance refers to the servicer arranging for a period of 
less than six months (short term forbearance) or four to twelve months (long-term for-
bearance) during which payments will be reduced or suspended, followed by a repayment 
plan to make up monies not collected during the forbearance period. Bankruptcy is con-
sidered to be a workout by some servicers because, without changing original loan terms, 
it allows borrowers to remain in the home for several years while they attempt to pay 
back their loan.  
Modifications (‘mods’) are generally any permanent changes to loan terms. These are 
usually a later effort to minimize the net present value of losses when earlier plans have 
not succeeded. In most cases modifications are used when the borrower has had a tempo-
rary financial hardship but cannot make up arrears on his own. In this case the arrearage 
is added to the principal balance and monthly payments recalculated (term extensions are 
usually prohibited). Less frequently modifications are used when the household has suf-
fered a permanent loss of income (e.g., disability rendering one wage earner unable to 
work) but has demonstrated a commitment to remain in the home.  
An example of the latter type of modification is presented in Figure 12. The household’s 
monthly after-tax income has fallen by $300 (14 percent) and the modification lowers 
monthly mortgage payments by $170. The change reinstates the borrower and lowers 
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payments to a level that is affordable given the changed circumstances that led to the de-
linquency. The last row of the table reflects an aspect of workouts that is important to 
many lenders — keeping post-hardship debt-to-income ratios commensurate with those 
prior to the hardship. Mods have been become increasingly common over the past few 
years, in large measure because they have been shown to be successful in avoiding losses 
due to foreclosure.  
Figure 12: Typical Pre- and Post-Hardship Ratios for  
Household with Modified Loan 
 
 
 
Voluntary title transfer workouts include deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, short sales, and 
mortgage assumption. In a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure transfer, the servicer determines 
that owning the home immediately — thereby avoiding the costs of the foreclosure proc-
ess — is the cost-minimizing way out of the loan. A borrower accepting this workout op-
tion relinquishes any ownership interest in the home. A short sale is similar in that the 
borrower is allowed to pay less than what is owed, in this case by selling the home for 
less than this amount and turning the proceeds over to the servicer. Such sales are based 
on the servicer’s determination that the difference between the short-sale selling price and 
the amount owed is greater than the cost of taking the borrower through the foreclosure 
process. A mortgage assumption occurs where a new party that has been approved by the 
lender assumes the original borrower’s mortgage obligation. In the only published esti-
mate of the savings associated with voluntary title transfer workouts for prime mortgages, 
Focardi (2002) found that, while costs are still high, they were roughly $14,000 lower 
and saved six months, relative to going through foreclosure. 
 
Pre-Hardship Post-Hardship
Monthly Net Income $2,200 $1,900
Mortgage Payment $770 $600
Non-mortgage Recurring Monthly Obligations and Expenses $1,080 $1,080
Total Monthly Expenses $1,850 $1,680
Net Debt-to-Income Ratio 1.19 1.13
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5.2. DECIDING WHEN TO WORKOUT AND WHEN TO FORECLOSE  
As noted in the previous section, loan servicers typically use complex mathematical 
models embedded in software programs (‘scoring tools’) to allocate collections resources 
relatively early in the default process. These scoring tools do not suggest who should get 
a workout, or what form workout options should take, however. This is the province of 
‘decisioning’ tools which may or may not be combined with ‘scripting’ software that 
guides collections and default management counselors through a series of questions de-
signed to gather the data necessary to determine whether a delinquent account is salvage-
able. The decisioning phase involves determining which route maximizes the present 
value of the loan given factors such as the stage of delinquency, borrower and loan char-
acteristics, and applicable state laws governing the foreclosure process. An investors’ list 
of acceptable modification alternatives and conditions can also be included in the soft-
ware. Scripting is one way to ensure that all the information needed to compare workout 
alternatives is collected. As evidence of the diversity of industry practices, however, one 
of our interviewees from a major subprime outfit argued that these tools prevent the ser-
vicer from “listening to the borrower” and that the function is best left to well-trained 
specialists. Another noted that that automated decisioning tools often miss relevant com-
ponents of a borrower’s situation in the subprime market.  
While decisioning tools can assess the financial ability of the borrower to continue pay-
ing the loan under various workout scenarios, they are not able to determine the bor-
rower’s level of commitment to doing so. This factor, called ‘desire’ or ‘willingness’ in 
the servicing industry, is the subject of behavioral models under development. Though in 
its infancy, these models are continually improving and may some day be as prevalent 
and effective in servicing as credit scoring has become in originations. In the meantime, 
servicers complement their effort to model desire by deploying their best and most ex-
perienced counselors on the toughest cases. 
Cutts and Green (2003) point out that while on a case-by-case basis workouts are in-
tended to (and presumably do) lessen losses relative to pursuing foreclosure, there is a 
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systemic concern that the increased availability of workout options will reduce the bor-
rower’s diligence and effort in meeting their payment obligations (i.e., a classic moral 
hazard problem). For this reason, lenders often mandate that to be eligible for a workout, 
borrowers must have gotten into trouble through an involuntary inability to pay such as a 
job loss, illness, or injury. (Others disagree, noting that the reason for default is not as 
important in determining which workout option minimizes loss severity.)  
Cutts and Green (2003) also note that the state-level legal context, including provisions 
concerning payment of deficiency judgments (i.e., allowing other assets of borrowers 
whose homes are foreclosed upon to be claimed by the creditor) can influence borrower 
behavior. The influence of state laws on lenders’ expectations about borrower behavior is 
supported by Pence (2003) who shows that, all else being equal, loan sizes in housing 
markets that span state borders are smaller in states that forbid deficiency judgments than 
on the other side of the border where they are permitted, a fact she attributes to lenders 
rationally limiting their exposure to risk under the differing legal regimes. 
5.3 DOES SECURITIZATION LIMIT WORKOUTS? 
Despite the appeal of workouts — when offered judiciously they are by most accounts 
better for the borrower, investor, and servicer — some claim their usage is limited by 
rules associated with the securitization process. To the extent that they exist, such rules 
could unnecessarily raise default and foreclosure levels. The issue receiving most atten-
tion is the alleged ‘five-percent threshold’ on loan modifications in pools whose cash 
flows have been securitized. In reality, the five percent figure does exist (since the spring 
of 2003) but only applies to mods where missed payments and penalties are capitalized, 
called ‘capitalization mods.’ 37  Further, while the bond rating agencies insist on the 
threshold, the language in the P&S is crafted in such a way that the restriction is not bind-
ing. 
                                                 
37
 Capitalization mods involve adding arrearage (delinquent principal and interest, escrow advances, and 
fees) to the principal balance of the loan and re-amortizing the loan over the remaining term. They are usu-
ally combined with a permanent reduction in interest rate or lengthening of the loan term in order to lower 
the borrower’s monthly payment in response to a permanent reduction in income. 
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Limiting modifications to a share of the pool is a somewhat coarse solution to address the 
fact that some servicers had previously abused the ability to modify loans. According to 
one industry insider, such abuses included making modifications that were not in the bor-
rower’s best interest, merely postponing inevitable losses. Servicers might be motivated 
to do this because servicing contracts have triggers built in that, for example, forbid re-
lease of overcollateralization to residual holders if the share of nonperforming loans is 
too high. In order to ensure that poolwide defaults remain low enough not to hit this trig-
ger, these lenders would modify loans (thereby reclassifying them as current or perform-
ing), thus avoiding making the marketplace aware of the fact that they were not able to 
pay a class of bondholders (as well as avoiding angering the actual bondholder). Using 
modifications could also improve trading of securities, benefiting the issuer’s reputation 
by managing the share of performing loans. Finally, the five-percent threshold is intended 
to impose some discipline on lenders who modify too frequently simply because they are 
not adept at determining which borrowers should be offered a mod and which should not. 
As noted above, however, the five-percent threshold is not firm.38 The P&S typically re-
fers to exceeding the five-percent threshold on mods ‘pending rating agency approval.’ In 
theory (since the practice of including the five-percent language is so new no one has 
reached the threshold yet), lenders who hit the five-percent ceiling can go to the rating 
agency and present their case. By showing that their modifications have been effective in 
mitigating losses and explaining their reasons for wanting to do more, servicers feel that 
they will be allowed to exceed the five-percent threshold without triggering a ratings ac-
tion on the securities. However, a large degree of uncertainty remains as to whether secu-
rities contracts do in fact limit a servicer’s flexibility in the pursuit of realistic workout 
options. The ratings agencies may need to better understand mitigation efforts so that in-
novative efforts by servicers can be more strongly encouraged.  
                                                 
38
 In practice, the five-percent limit is not overly restrictive either, because it is based on the original pool 
balance at the time securitization. Since this balance begins shrinking immediately as borrowers prepay, the 
pool of potentially modified loans declines over time, making reaching the cap a larger challenge than it 
might initially appear. 
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Other aspects of the argument that ‘securitization limits foreclosure avoidance options’ 
are less well specified than the one dealing with the five-percent capitalization modifica-
tion threshold. Some observers contend, for example, that enabling the sale of servicing 
rights has resulted in the emergence of a class of servicers whose financial interests are 
not aligned with those of either the borrower or the investor. As discussed earlier, how-
ever, the relative effectiveness of different servicing models has not been definitively es-
tablished in the marketplace, an event that may only occur in the face of a true housing 
market downturn. 
5.4. FAILED LOANS: REO AND WALKAWAYS/WRITE-OFFS 
When workout plans and modifications are unsuccessful, or when servicers determine 
that a workout is no longer an economical choice, there are two routes a failed loan can 
take: REO and write-offs. Servicers take property into REO (real estate owned) portfolios 
when they determine that doing so will minimize investor losses. Since a prerequisite for 
such determinations is that the property has sufficient value to justify the expenditures 
associated with the foreclosure process, they tend to be relatively higher-quality homes. 
For very low-value homes or those properties associated with other negative characteris-
tics (e.g., court cases, code violations, liability issues), the lender simply writes off the 
loan to avoid compounding investor losses with expenses such as property taxes, insur-
ance, and a variety of maintenance costs, including city ordinance requirements. In this 
case, title legally remains with the borrower (although the borrower is often unaware of 
this and has vacated the home), making it difficult later for municipal authorities or 
neighborhood groups to deal effectively with the vacant property.  
One REO specialist interviewed for this report described the process through which loans 
reach REO as follows. At ninety days past due (DPD) the company conducts an initial 
evaluation to determine whether there is sufficient value in the home to initiate foreclo-
sure proceedings. (At most institutions foreclosure proceedings and workout efforts pro-
ceed simultaneously due to the length of the foreclosure process and the imperative to 
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foreclose as quickly as possible when the loan cannot be saved).39 In rare cases where 
value is insufficient at this early stage, the company ceases further recovery efforts, in 
some cases releasing the lien but leaving the borrower in title. This value estimation is 
repeated periodically as the foreclosure process unfolds (with the same possible outcomes 
as at 90 DPD) and a final time prior to the foreclosure sale. If a determination is made not 
to take the property to REO, the company can avoid assuming title by writing off the as-
set and not bidding at the sale. 
REO is costly because it requires servicers to arrange for the repair, maintenance and re-
sale of the property. They must also stay current on property taxes. This requires that 
large national servicing firms maintain a large network of vendors to perform these ser-
vices. The challenge and cost of assembling and policing these networks is substantial 
and is one reason why servicing is amenable to economies of scale.  
It is worth remembering that the loan and the servicer typically have been bleeding cash 
on behalf of the trust for months, if not longer, by the time properties enter the REO port-
folio. In addition, the fact that a vacant property may continue to lose value can add fur-
ther costs until the property is sold. In addition to cost to investors, there can also be 
negative impacts for vulnerable neighborhoods. Servicers often have little incentive to 
engage in the time-consuming and costly process of conducting a thorough rehabilitation, 
especially since housing markets in the neighborhoods where foreclosures concentrate are 
often weak. Though some do so in cases where the costs are offset by anticipated higher 
sales value of the rehabbed unit, many rationally ‘paint and patch’ in order to turn the 
property around as quickly as possible.  
This has several neighborhood impacts. First, the failure to fully rehab a home may pose 
problems to the new owners, especially lower-income borrowers who may lack the re-
                                                 
39
 Moody’s (2001) servicer evaluations describe this process as follows: “Moody’s believes that better ser-
vicers pursue both early settlements and foreclosures simultaneously. That way, if early settlement efforts 
are unsuccessful, the foreclosure process is already underway and costly delays may be minimized. Addi-
tionally, many servicers incorporate the foreclosure process into their efforts as a way of impressing the 
seriousness of the situation on a borrower.” 
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sources to address any needed structural repairs. Second, since potential owner-occupiers 
may shy away entirely from purchasing an REO property in poor repair, many are sold to 
investors who rent them in a shabby state to tenants at whatever rate the market will bear. 
In either of these scenarios, the property can and often does deteriorate further, and in 
doing so drags down property values in the rest of the neighborhood as well. 
If anything, the neighborhood impact of write-offs is worse and the legal issues associ-
ated with intervention even more complex. When a loan is written off, in some cases the 
borrower remains in the home. In such cases the home is already in poor and potentially 
unsafe condition as evidenced by the fact that the servicer determined that the interest of 
the trust is best served by relinquishing claim to it. Often, however, the borrower has al-
ready left the home and is unaware (and most likely not interested in the fact that) he or 
she holds title. The home, now a ‘walkaway,’ does not go through the foreclosure process 
and hence sits in limbo, deteriorating. Those agents interested in ameliorating its negative 
impact on the neighborhood (community groups, municipalities, and others with proper-
ties in the area) have no way to take control of the property, since state laws governing 
title transfer and foreclosure procedures were not designed to handle cases such as these. 
In some cases municipal ordinances permit or mandate the demolition of such buildings, 
but otherwise it is difficult to do anything about them. 
In order to take control of the ‘walkaway’ problem, some community-based organizations 
and cities are exploring legislation allowing the creation of nonprofit corporations formed 
especially to take these properties through foreclosure in order to free up title. These enti-
ties would then hold title to the unit, which they could transfer to existing CBOs who 
would then take responsibility for rehabbing the properties and ensuring that they reenter 
the housing stock in a structurally robust state and with a capable owner-occupier. 
The complexity of issues involved in the foreclosure/REO/write-off process is central to 
the impact of failed loans on vulnerable neighborhoods and industry bottom lines. Prob-
lem properties are not only sources of large losses to investors but are also magnates for 
illicit behavior that depress surrounding property values. Streamlining and rationalizing 
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these processes is essential in order to shorten the period of deterioration and vacancy and 
make it easier to transfer these properties into the hands of actors seeking to improve or 
remove them for the sake of the neighborhoods of which they are part. 
5.5. WHAT PREVENTS BETTER OUTCOMES? 
Servicers interviewed for this study were unanimous in claiming that foreclosure was not 
only an undesirable outcome for borrowers, it was bad for business as well. Given the 
general alignment of incentives, how then do foreclosures come about? One respondent 
developed a loose, four-class foreclosure typology comprised of two borrower-induced 
problems and two industry-induced problems: (1) borrowers who refuse to contact or be 
contacted by the servicer; (2) borrowers who remain unrealistic about their ability to meet 
payment obligations following a permanent income shock (i.e., divorce, disability, or 
death of an earner); (3) victimization by fraudulent or abusive origination practices; and 
(4) servicing by firms lacking the resources and, in some cases, technological sophistica-
tion to meet the challenges of servicing in the subprime market.40 
In addition to these paths to foreclosure, the industry is also plagued by borrower fraud. 
There are a variety of permutations, often involving some combination of brokers, ap-
praisers, and borrowers. These scams have a large enough impact on losses that servicers 
and issuers have invested heavily in fraud detection systems that evaluate loan applica-
tions for suspect characteristics and patterns. One firm reported on their special 12-point 
‘purchase money checklist’ that subjects nonrefinance loans to additional scrutiny. To 
illustrate the nature of such fraud, several servicers told of a scheme in which the fraud 
purveyor will arrange to have a low-value building appraised for well above its market 
value. This individual then finds a presumably financially unsophisticated collaborator 
with a clean but undeveloped credit history to apply for a subprime loan on the property. 
Assuming the loan is approved, the fraud purveyor pays a modest sum (often just $5,000) 
to the collaborator and walks away with the balance of the loan funds. The individual in 
                                                 
40
 This respondent also noted that a small minority of borrowers appear to lose their homes as a result of 
substance abuse or gambling problems. As evidence, the interviewee referred specifically to cases where 
the financial documentation available to the servicer indicate substantial capacity to meet payment obliga-
tions but the borrower consistently failed to do so. 
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whose name the loan was made disappears and no payment is ever made on the loan. One 
interviewee called this “renting out someone’s credit history.” 
In addition to these more direct avenues, some foreclosures result from the fact that sub-
prime servicing models are still works in progress. In general, there is insufficient data to 
calibrate models predicting subprime loan-repayment behavior. Both servicers and the 
rating agencies are collecting and tracking this data with the goal of improving current 
credit-risk assessment capabilities, but the industry as a whole is not there yet. A related 
issue is the attempt to recalibrate models established for the prime market for the sub-
prime market. Simply having enough years of data is one problem, but getting relation-
ships between variables properly established is another. At this time it is an open question 
whether relationships are consistent across the two markets. As evidence of this point, 
several servicers interviewed for this report claimed that Freddie Mac’s EarlyIndicator, a 
scoring tool widely utilized in the prime market, is not as effective as similar tools devel-
oped especially for the subprime market. 
Others argue that the rise of subprime foreclosures reflects the structure of the market-
place, and the fact that task segmentation limits the ability of the industry to self-correct. 
According to this view, elevated foreclosure rates are in part the combined effect of the 
origination issues detailed earlier and the fact that securitization renders most of the funds 
invested in a pool of loans immune from credit risk (Taff 2003). Servicers report, for ex-
ample, that residual and mezzanine investors are more vigilant and attentive to servicing 
performance than holders of investment-grade tranches. While these investors might also 
be expected to have spent more time assessing the originators of loans in the pool and, 
where possible, avoiding those with a history of poor performance, in practice it is often 
difficult to gain useful information below the issuer level.  
Under most circumstances, therefore, only a small minority of investors has an incentive 
to examine and track originator performance and to a great extent these investors cannot 
observe it anyway. In this context the feedback that investor decisions would ordinarily 
supply to improve origination practices is substantially attenuated and, in combination 
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with the fact that securitization makes it easy to price away the additional risk produced 
by flawed origination practices, does little to purge these practices. Though enhanced due 
diligence and increased familiarity with the market are helping lenders and servicers bet-
ter understand risks and borrower fraud, the upshot may well be persistence of foreclo-
sure-related issues stemming from subprime lending. 
It is also clear that borrowers bear some of the blame for foreclosures. First, a substantial 
minority simply refuse all contact from the servicer. Possible explanations include that 
they think the servicer is the enemy; they do not want to remain in the home; they may 
have stretched the truth in their mortgage application and are worried about being caught; 
or their approach to dealing with mortgage problems is what one interviewee called 
“sticking their head in the sand.” One servicing executive estimates that, despite repeated 
attempts, the firm is unable to establish contact with the borrower on fully half of the 
loans it refers to foreclosure. As evidence of the challenge of simply reaching the bor-
rower to discuss the loan, one can look at the rating agencies’ servicer evaluations show-
ing ‘right party contact rates’ during collections, a measure of the frequency with which 
servicers are able to reach borrowers to initiate a discussion of payment interruptions. As 
figure 13 indicates, even the largest and most highly rated subprime servicers have trou-
ble reaching borrowers. A servicing technology expert at Freddie Mac referred to steps to 
educate borrowers that currently “just disappear” as the “missing element … in borrower 
education” (Cordell 2001). 
Figure 13: Servicer Ratings and Contact Rates 
 
 
 
 
Servicer
2002 B&C 
Servicing 
Rank
2002 B&C 
Servicing 
Volume 
(bil.$)
Moody's 
Residential 
Primary 
Servicer 
Right 
Party 
Contact 
Rate 
Ocwen Federal Bank 4 30.4 SQ1 29
Option One Mortgage 5 28.1 SQ1 25
Homecomings Financial Network (GMAC-RFC) 6 27.4 SQ1 29
Ameriquest Mortgage Company 8 17.0 SQ2 30
Litton Loan Servcing (C-BASS) 13 10.8 SQ1 22
Saxon Mortgage Services 17 17.6 SQ2 36
EMC Mortgage 20 6.0 SQ1 17
Note: SQ1 is the highest rating on a scale of SQ1-SQ5.
Source: Moody's Servicer Reports and Inside B&C Lending.
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A final concern in the foreclosure arena is the possibility that the ‘headline risk’ of being 
a foreclosing agent will drive larger and better capitalized organizations out of subprime 
servicing. As one servicer told us, “no matter how hard we push loss mitigation and fore-
closure avoidance, we are still going to have to foreclose on ten thousand borrowers 
every year.” Playing this role in the system makes a forecloser vulnerable to targeting and 
pressure from advocacy groups and the press. If large firms judge this risk to be too high, 
it is possible that the market will be left to less well-known firms with reduced reputa-
tional incentive to avoid foreclosures and lesser willingness to work with community 
groups to develop better foreclosure avoidance strategies. To some extent reputational 
concerns were behind Bank of America’s sale of its subprime servicing portfolio to Fair-
banks. To the extent that Fairbanks lacked the capacity to be an effective servicer of sub-
prime loans, arguably borrowers would have been better served if Bank of America had 
remained in the business. 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
In the end, not all loans can be saved. All servicers mentioned a core of borrowers who 
are simply not interested in saving the home. For the rest, however, the ability to find 
ways to keep them in their homes if possible, and ease them out in ways that result in as 
little psychological, financial, and credit damage as possible are largely consistent with 
efforts to mitigate both investor losses and neighborhood-level negative externalities. The 
final section of the report examines proposals for making more of these win-win solu-
tions a reality. 
Preserving Homeownership: Community-Development Implications of the New Mortgage Market 
 82 
Section 6: PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: THE ROLE OF 
BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNITY-BASED  
ORGANIZATIONS IN FORECLOSURE AVOIDANCE 
The preceding sections of this report have documented the adverse impacts that rising 
foreclosures have on low-income and low-wealth households forced out of their homes 
and on bottom lines of businesses and investors incurring foreclosure-induced losses, as 
well as the less obvious adverse impacts that foreclosures have on affected neighbor-
hoods. Concentrated foreclosures in fact threaten to reverse several decades of effort by 
local governments, community-based organizations, and the mortgage industry to revital-
ize distressed urban neighborhoods. This final section presents a series of proposals to 
address these issues. The proposals are organized into five broad classes.  
The first approach involves efforts to better detect, monitor, and avoid foreclosures. The 
second set of proposals concerns ways to help borrowers in distress to avoid ending up in 
foreclosure. The third grouping suggests ways to minimize the impact of unavoidable 
foreclosures in economically distressed communities where they occur. The fourth ap-
proach examines potential industry responses to the current foreclosure situation. The 
fifth section considers ways to better prepare borrowers to participate in the subprime 
mortgage market. The report concludes with an examination of the social tolerance for 
risk and its role in motivating public policy. 
6.1. IMPROVED DATA COLLECTION TO SUPPORT FORECLOSURE MONITORING 
AND AVOIDANCE EFFORTS 
The rapid rise of subprime lending and associated rise in foreclosures has caught many — 
from industry and policy analysts to government officials and community activists — off 
guard.41 This is due in no small part to the fact that there is little data available to gov-
ernment agencies charged with tracking the mortgage sector of the economy or to the 
general public. Although information on individual foreclosures is generally on file at 
                                                 
41
 One of a group of senior community-development officials interviewed for this report lamented that, “we 
just didn’t see this coming.” He went on to note that his organization now focuses almost exclusively on 
assisting individuals facing foreclosure and working to mitigate the negative impact that foreclosures are 
having on already struggling neighborhoods.  
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courthouses or land registry offices, there has been surprisingly little effort to systemati-
cally collect these records. Where available, data from foreclosure documents often fail to 
identify key characteristics of the mortgage loan or the identity of the originator, funder, 
or servicer — information essential to illuminating the factors that precipitate foreclo-
sures.  
To the extent that there is a growing understanding of the determinants of loan perform-
ance, it is largely in private hands and not readily available even to those entities charged 
with monitoring the activities of mortgage sector of the economy, including the U.S. De-
partment of Treasury, HUD, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, or other bank regu-
lators. In light of this situation, the report presents three proposals to better monitor, as-
sess, and respond to the challenges posed by rising foreclosures. 
Data Proposal 1: Create a National Loan Performance, Default, and Foreclosure Data 
Base. Federal regulators should collect default (90 DPD) and foreclosure (starts and 
completions) data and make it available to the public for analysis. Clearly a national elec-
tronic database on loan performance is needed to support policy development and evalua-
tion, to detect and react to foreclosure hot spots, and to identify the number of borrowers 
at risk of falling prey to predatory mortgage lenders. Ideally such a database would in-
clude data on loan, lender, servicer, property, and borrower characteristics sufficient to 
track foreclosures and ultimately to assess the key determinants of serious mortgage de-
linquency and default. Such research is already underway in the private sector as firms 
attempt to enhance development and underwriting of loan products and to streamline ser-
vicing of problem loans. Due to the significant external costs associated with mortgage 
foreclosures, government agencies and the interested public must have this data as well to 
support efforts to ensure that the public interest is being protected and public costs kept to 
a minimum.  
Lack of data is an even greater problem in the area of mortgage servicing, where aggre-
gate-level information is limited and there are no readily available public sources of mi-
cro-level data. Recall that servicing rights are bought and sold regularly, and various as-
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pects of servicing a single loan may be handled by different entities. As a result, should a 
problem arise, borrowers and their advocates often encounter obstacles simply talking to 
a person who has the capacity to investigate and resolve the problem. The lack of data on 
servicers also can be a problem for lenders. For example, the lack of a comprehensive 
repository of consumer complaints against particular servicers, not to mention the lack of 
a comprehensive database of court cases either completed or pending against servicers, 
limits the ability of lenders and issuers to appropriately select and monitor the entities 
that service their loans.  
The additional benefits of enhanced, nationally available data on servicing practices and 
foreclosures are numerous. At the federal level, such data would support detailed analysis 
of the determinants of the foreclosure process, shape more effective legislation and regu-
lations to mitigate individual and public-sector foreclosure costs, and assist in the design 
of enhanced regulations to minimize the extent of abusive lending and servicing practices 
that are linked to an unknown share of the current foreclosure wave. More importantly, 
better data would enable local officials to identify current foreclosure hot spots and move 
to take remedial action. Lacking data, federal agencies are currently in a reactive mode on 
the foreclosure issue.  
As evidence of what might be achieved, HMDA and CRA are illustrative. More than 25 
years ago these acts initiated a data-gathering and monitoring effort that led to a greater 
understanding of how best to expand access to mortgage credit. A similar data collection 
effort on a national scale for loan performance, delinquency, and default is now needed. 
Lacking specific legal authority to mandate the collection of these data, the Federal Re-
serve Board of Governors could work in cooperation with HUD and other federal regula-
tors to develop a data collection protocol and seek voluntary compliance.42 Another ap-
proach would be for the Fed to use existing authority and make participation in a national 
                                                 
42
 Currently, the largest repositories of these data include the GSEs, financial services conglomerates, and 
the rating agencies. In the face of rising subprime losses these firms began amassing loan performance data 
and now possess sizeable databases. For obvious reasons no single firm that has incurred the expense of 
constructing such a database is willing to simply turn it over to the public in the micro-data format that 
would support serious assessment of the determinants of foreclosures.  
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loan-performance data collection effort eligible for CRA service test credit for regulated 
entities. By adding a data-sharing component to CRA evaluations, the Fed could increase 
the pressure on major banking organizations to contribute to the creation of better data, 
without the need for new legislative authority that would be required to make the submis-
sion of these data mandatory.  
Data Proposal 2: Identify and Respond to Potential Foreclosure Hot Spots.
 Enhanced 
foreclosure data would also enable local officials to better gear up to meet the challenges 
of foreclosure and do so earlier in the process. Availability of detailed data on loan origi-
nation, foreclosure, and loan performance at the local level could enable identification of 
emerging foreclosure ‘hot spots.’ While such a hot spot detection system could be a by-
product of the creation of a national database, local officials could aid such efforts by 
automating and making more widely available existing ‘courthouse’ data. Having a data-
base capable of identifying areas with elevated rates of foreclosure filings would enable 
local officials — working in partnership with local community-based organizations as 
well as interested mortgage servicers — to take appropriate action. 
The National Training and Information Center and affiliates have worked to combat ris-
ing foreclosures in the Federal Housing Administration program that result from exten-
sive fraud by both appraisers and lenders involved in the program. As a result, NTIC and 
HUD created the Credit Watch and Appraiser Watch programs. Based on analysis of 
FHA default data, lenders and appraisers associated with a high number of defaults had 
their authority to make FHA loans terminated. For example, any lender with a default rate 
more than twice that of the average regional and national default rates is cut from the 
program, and prohibited from making FHA loans. In addition to monitoring and sanction-
ing abusive lenders and appraisers, these same FHA data could be utilized to identify 
FHA foreclosure hot spots. 
Recognizing the complexity of the mortgage foreclosure process, it would also be useful 
for local governments to create a ‘foreclosure hot spot protocol,’ or a plan formulated in 
advance of problem detection that describes specific actions designed to minimize the 
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adverse consequences of extreme foreclosure levels. For example, municipal tax collec-
tion agencies could exercise temporary restraint in collecting funds from owner occu-
pants residing in foreclosure hot spots if such efforts would allow the homeowners to re-
main in their homes. By helping individual owners avoid foreclosure, such forbearance 
activities could help to stabilize a local market and in doing so actually increase the 
amount of taxes collected in the area over the longer run. Moreover, to the extent that a 
municipality has access to resources to support loss mitigation efforts or to avoid foreclo-
sure, it may choose to devote these resources to solve problems in specially identified 
‘hot spots.’ In addition, the city could strive to weave the efforts of the community-based 
organizations and mortgage lenders and servicers pursuing their own foreclosure avoid-
ance programs in the area into its protocol. 
Data Proposal 3: Assess the Neighborhood Impact of Foreclosures. The allegation that 
subprime foreclosures cluster and that rising foreclosures can generate additional foreclo-
sures and destabilize entire neighborhoods is a persistent one. This suggests the need for 
several studies. The first such study would examine the extent to which clustering of 
foreclosures increases the likelihood of foreclosure in neighboring properties — an em-
pirical examination of the so-called ‘foreclosure contagion effect.’ One possible explana-
tion for such an effect is the negative impact that foreclosures have on house price values 
and trends, which in turn leave other borrowers less willing to meet their mortgage pay-
ments on an asset of declining value. Industry experts interviewed for this study ac-
knowledged that a potential ‘contagion effect’ would be relevant to the correct evaluation 
of mortgage risk and in subsequent pricing. 
The second study would seek to understand the full cost of foreclosures, that is, to esti-
mate the size of the direct ‘externality effects’ of foreclosure.43 Doing so would involve 
not only tallying the additional drain on municipal services but also require careful 
                                                 
43
 In principal, a default, foreclosure, and subsequent resale of a property should have no more impact on a 
community than any other real estate transaction. But in fact foreclosed properties pose special issues. For 
example, to the extent that foreclosed properties are ‘boarded up’ or otherwise not well maintained during 
the foreclosure process, they may undermine the appeal, and ultimately the market value, of other proper-
ties in the neighborhood. 
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econometric estimates of the impact of concentrated foreclosure on changes in house 
prices. Such a study could help focus attention on public costs of foreclosure that extend 
beyond those suffered by the borrower and investor. 
6.2. HELPING BORROWERS IN DISTRESS 
Dramatic increases in foreclosure rates attending the rise of subprime lending have high-
lighted the need to help borrowers in distress. Such help not only improves the situation 
of individual families and creditors, but ultimately the neighborhoods in which they re-
side. This section discusses five ways to aid borrowers, all involving collaboration be-
tween industry, CBOs, and government. 
Aiding Distressed Borrowers Proposal 1: Partnering to Increase Contact Rates. Ser-
vicers interviewed for this study repeatedly bemoaned the fact that many loans fail with-
out contact ever being established with the borrower, or when the first contact occurs af-
ter problems have become too severe to rectify. In response, the most proactive servicers 
have impressive programs to establish and maintain contact with their clients. These ef-
forts are driven by concern for the bottom line, but can nonetheless improve outcomes for 
borrowers who would otherwise have avoided all contact with the servicer when they en-
countered payment problems. A first step to increasing contact rates at the industry level 
would involve disseminating best practices from those organizations that excel in this 
area.44 Because contact rates even for the leaders remain fairly low, however, a strategy is 
needed that goes beyond what industry has been able to achieve on its own to date. 
The pilot partnership between Homecomings Financial Network45  and Neighborhood 
Housing Services of Chicago (NHS) is a promising way forward. Homecomings is bet-
ting that some borrowers who are unwilling to talk to the company directly will talk first 
to NHS instead. Upon contacting NHS, these borrowers are offered the option of inde-
pendent credit counseling (see discussion later in this section) or speaking with a Home-
                                                 
44
 Of course such a program threatens to benefit less innovative servicers along with borrowers and 
neighborhoods, so any such proposal must be done in a way to protect the competitive advantage of the 
leaders in effective servicing in order to maintain their incentive to innovate. 
45
 The servicing arm of GMAC-RFC. 
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comings representative based in the NHS office. The partnership allows the organizations 
to work together to arrive at appropriate workouts, and provides borrowers with a trusted 
advisor to guide them in what can be an intimidating process. Homecomings has sta-
tioned servicing staff in the NHS office in order to facilitate this contact, increase its local 
presence, and provide learning opportunities for both organizations on the resources 
available and potential workout solutions.  
Initial results of this approach point to success. Between April 1 and September 30, 2003, 
NHS counseled 372 clients at risk of foreclosure. Although it was not possible to avoid 
foreclosure in every instance, the program was able to achieve 186 ‘successful outcomes’ 
(defined as any resolution of the situation that did not result in the property becoming va-
cant and abandoned). These successes resulted from NHS staff interventions with lend-
ers, accessing private and public loan and grant resources (such as the Neighborhood 
Lending Program or Homeless Prevention Fund), or refinancing through NHS or a part-
ner lender in order to achieve a more sustainable mortgage for the owner. This includes 
47 loans to prevent foreclosures on $2.3 million in loan balances.  
In addition, in November 2003 NHS and Homecomings partnered to invite 1,000 Home-
comings borrowers — ranging from those current on their loans to those in foreclosure — 
to a financial education workshop. The homeowners were provided with a free dinner and 
a gift certificate. The invited homeowners lived in four NHS neighborhoods, Chicago 
Lawn, Auburn Gresham, West Englewood, and Back of the Yards, all of which have 
been hard-hit by foreclosures. Forty-five homeowners attended and were educated about 
refinancing opportunities, how to finance home improvements, and default and foreclo-
sure avoidance.  
Aiding Distressed Borrowers Proposal 2: Restructure Regulations that Limit Ser-
vicers’ Ability to Help Borrowers. Another concern among servicers stems from the rules 
of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and Fair Debt Collection Act (FDCA) that limit 
the ways in which servicers can contact mortgage borrowers. For example, under FDCA 
servicers cannot mention the mortgage delinquency (and hence the fact that they might be 
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proposing a workout) on recorded messages left during collections calls. Essentially all 
contacts termed aggressive are prohibited even if they are for the borrower’s own good. 
Moreover, privacy rules also limit servicers’ capacity to provide information to others 
concerning borrowers in distress, even if such dissemination of information is done to 
determine whether the borrower is eligible for a city- or CBO-sponsored foreclosure 
avoidance program. Finally FCRA mandates that servicers providing information to non-
profit credit counselors for the purpose of contacting borrowers must become registered 
credit reporting bureaus. The regulatory burden associated with doing so is, to say the 
least, prohibitive.  
While consumers must be shielded from egregious credit collection practices, in many 
instances existing regulations have the unintended consequence of limiting the options of 
servicers trying to arrange early workout options for borrowers in danger of losing their 
homes. One alternative approach would be to keep the current framework in place, but 
carve out exceptions to the basic rules in which the public benefits associated with avoid-
ing foreclosures outweigh the private benefits of protecting consumer privacy. Such re-
forms could be linked to the ‘hot spot’ protocols discussed earlier. In situations where a 
local government identifies the existence of a concentration of foreclosures, servicers 
would be given greater leeway to work cooperatively with city government and local 
CBOs to pursue a strategy of foreclosure avoidance and customer outreach.  
Aiding Distressed Borrowers Proposal 3: Connecting Borrowers to Existing Sources 
of Assistance. In addition to efforts involving servicers directly, municipal resources can 
be used to overcome information bottlenecks. Several cities, including Chicago, have be-
gun providing foreclosure-avoidance information through 311 systems, a non-emergency 
city call center equipped to receive inquiries about city services and direct callers to ap-
propriate city agencies or delegate agencies. Chicago’s program offers borrowers the 
chance to speak to a person who can help them take the next step in addressing the prob-
lems they are facing. Callers to the system are directed to counseling agencies or partici-
pating loan servicers for help in finding the best way out of temporary financial crises 
and mitigating the downside effects of permanent income reductions. 
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As discussed throughout this report, servicing firms have elaborate systems of people and 
software to manage the delinquency, default and foreclosure process. The goal of these 
systems is basically to determine the loss-minimizing route to cure the default. In virtu-
ally all cases, however, these systems ignore information that could change this calcula-
tion because they do not have access to a detailed menu of municipal, state, and federal 
programs that supply funding and other forms of assistance to borrowers in trouble. Be-
cause most borrowers are also unaware of these alternatives, many families lose their 
home to foreclosure even though they could have been saved if they could have accessed 
these existing sources of assistance. 
The most obvious way to illustrate this point is to imagine those servicers that use soft-
ware tools to gather information that allows them to calculate the expected net present 
value of various workout options for delinquent borrowers. For example, the evaluation 
tools may suggest that foreclosure is the best option for the investor, even in situations 
where home retention options would become viable with the addition of a modest public 
subsidy. One specialist in distressed assets interviewed for this study estimated that in 
roughly one-third of foreclosure cases there is some public money available, but that it is 
rarely accessed because state and municipal level programs are idiosyncratic and there is 
no systematic method of making borrowers or servicers aware of these programs. This 
problem could best be rectified by centralizing program information and integrating it 
into software systems used to analyze foreclosure avoidance and loss mitigation options. 
Aiding Distressed Borrowers Proposal 4: Integrate Effective Credit Counseling into 
Loss Mitigation Strategies.
 For borrowers in trouble on their mortgage, credit counseling 
offers both promise and risks. When done by skilled counselors with the borrower’s in-
terests at heart, counseling can help borrowers chart the best course for navigating their 
financial difficulties. Credit counseling can literally be the difference between saving and 
losing a home. When done poorly, however, counseling is a waste of time and money. 
When done unscrupulously, it makes a bad situation worse. As industry and government 
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become increasingly supportive of these efforts, the pressure for counseling to be done 
effectively should increase.46 
As it moves toward greater interaction with credit counseling agencies, however, the 
mortgage industry must address several issues. First, a more effective method must be 
devised to separate legitimate, effective agencies from others. Many consumers currently 
rely on the IRS’s ‘nonprofit’ designation as evidence that the agency will act in their best 
interests, but this is by no means the case. Second, even among agencies that are not out 
to take advantage of borrowers through excessive fees and referrals for costly ancillary 
services, not all have the skills to counsel borrowers facing mortgage-related problems. 
Third, the effectiveness of various counseling methods has been subject to little empirical 
scrutiny. Different methods and programs must be evaluated and results disseminated so 
that more effective approaches supplant others.  
Finally, in a world in which many legitimate nonprofit counseling agencies continue to 
struggle for survival, the mortgage industry offers them little financial sustenance. The 
‘debt management plans’ (DMPs) through which these agencies earn fees historically 
have not included secured debt (a key reason why many agencies are not knowledgeable 
about mortgage issues). A new approach rewards counseling agencies for devising ‘ac-
tion plans’ for their clients that may or may not include an official DMP. This approach is 
more mortgage-focused and integrates secured and unsecured debt into financial advice 
for borrowers in trouble on their loan.  
Aiding Distressed Borrowers Proposal 5: Designing Additional Subsidies for Foreclo-
sure Avoidance.
 While the magnitude of the costs is unknown, foreclosures, especially 
those in distressed neighborhoods, are widely thought to trigger enormous local, state, 
and federal government expenditures on things such as crime prevention. Consequently, 
                                                 
46
 For several years, GMAC-RFC has paid for counseling and has formed an alliance with three credit 
counseling agencies called the Credit Counseling Resource Center (CCRC) to “help borrowers restore fi-
nancial balance to their lives.” Ameriquest’s Best Practices, for example, include provisions for free credit 
counseling by a nonaffiliated, nonprofit third party.  
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efforts to reduce the number of foreclosures or to limit the degree of financial distress 
suffered by the homeowner and damage or deterioration of the property can save money 
that government would have been forced to spend later on cleaning up the mess. To the 
extent that neighboring home values and foreclosure probabilities are affected by foreclo-
sure events, municipalities may also have a responsibility to help protect neighboring 
owners from their ripple effects.  
Determining how government money could best be deployed is a challenge, however. 
One promising option is to make funds available to enhance loss mitigation and foreclo-
sure avoidance efforts already employed by servicers. This would essentially extend the 
margin of borrowers who would be able to remain in their homes based on their financial 
ability and ‘desire’ alone. Since resources are likely to be limited, localities must create 
clear borrower and neighborhood eligibility standards to ensure that limited public funds 
target those situations most deserving of assistance and/or produce the greatest public 
benefit. Further, avoiding a situation where government money substitutes for funds, for-
bearance, and forgiveness that lenders would have offered on their own is challenging. 
Rather than directly administer the foreclosure avoidance funds, it may be better to in-
volve qualified CBOs to help establish and monitor the use of clear guidelines under 
which participating private servicers determine whether a borrower meets the criteria es-
tablished for public assistance, and, if the borrower is eligible for assistance, complete the 
transaction. In any event, even though more work is needed to develop the delivery vehi-
cle for federal, state, or local foreclosure avoidance assistance, there is broad agreement 
among individuals interviewed for this study that if injected at the right point, such a sub-
sidy could reduce foreclosures substantially. 
Aiding Distressed Borrowers Proposal 6: Helping Victims Refinance Out of Predatory 
Loans. Another way to help victims of abusive predatory loans is to support the creation 
of targeted refinance loan pools to assist borrows at risk of losing their home to foreclo-
sure. Lenders and servicers could help fund such loan pools, and the resulting loans could 
allow for qualified homeowners to refinance into a more affordable loan administered by 
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a nonprofit or intermediary lender. NHS of Chicago developed such a fund and it has 
proven to be an innovative strategy for keeping families in their homes. To date, 33 
homeowners at risk of foreclosure have refinanced with NHS through this special fund. 
Of course not all nonprofits have the capacity or lending experience to create such a fund, 
but where it exists, this strategy provides a good alternative to foreclosure.  
6.3. MAKING FORECLOSURE LESS DAMAGING TO NEIGHBORHOODS 
When foreclosure is unavoidable, lenders, municipalities, and community-based organi-
zations must focus efforts on preserving the properties for affordable homeownership. In 
many cases, the properties have been vacant for anywhere from six months to over a year 
and require substantial rehabilitation. In their deteriorated state, the properties are not 
marketable to owner occupants who lack financing, technical expertise or wherewithal to 
take on a purchase-rehab project. Thus, these properties are often purchased by investors 
who cosmetically rehab them and rent or sell them to unprepared families. Inadequately 
rehabbed properties often set the next owner up for failure due to overwhelming mainte-
nance costs in the early years of the loan. Too often, the cycle of foreclosure then contin-
ues, and the block and neighborhood suffer the impact of yet another foreclosure. This 
section discusses strategies to mitigate the effects of foreclosed properties on neighbor-
hoods. First, the foreclosure process could be shortened to avoid the drawn-out process 
that leads to property deterioration. Further, strategic partnerships between financial insti-
tutions and nonprofit developers can lead to the rehabilitation of key neighborhood prop-
erties and sale to owner occupants.  
Reducing Neighborhood Impact Proposal 1: Eliminate Counterproductive Regulation. 
In light of the dramatic rise in the number of foreclosures, now would be a good time to 
assess and potentially streamline and standardize state and local laws and regulation gov-
erning the foreclosure process. In addition to the challenges that heterogeneous foreclo-
sure regimes pose to servicers, many of these laws are outdated. Foreclosure legislation 
designed to slow the process down used to make sense, but now this is changing — espe-
cially to the extent that servicers adhere to emerging best practices that reflect the fact 
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that foreclosure is undesirable for borrowers and investors and, less obviously but no less 
significantly, for neighborhoods as well.  
While it remains important to offer a homeowner every reasonable effort to cure a default 
situation, foreclosure statutes have to recognize that the overall good is best served when 
the neighborhood-level benefit of a speedy and predictable foreclosure process is seen to 
outweigh the advantages to individual borrowers of a sluggish process. Standardizing and 
updating foreclosure law with an eye to eliminating provisions that simply delay inevita-
ble foreclosures while worsening their adverse impact on neighborhoods is an important 
element of regulatory reform.  
Reducing Neighborhood Impact Proposal 2: Create Programs to Transfer Properties 
to Community-Based Developers.
 As noted above, foreclosed homes are likely to have 
experienced deferred maintenance and deterioration, especially those located in distressed 
urban neighborhoods. After foreclosure — and prior to sale to a new owner occupant — 
is an ideal time to rehab the properties to a standard that addresses all health and safety 
issues as well as functional obsolescence of key structural elements of the home. Com-
munity-based developers with strategies of building long-term, sustainable homeowner-
ship are often in the best position to manage the extensive rehabilitation process, and to 
then market and sell the homes to owner occupants who have access to solid financing 
and are prepared to take on the responsibilities of homeownership. In order to make high-
quality rehabilitation financially feasible, nonprofit organizations must be able to acquire 
the property for low or no cost. In the past, when the majority of foreclosures were FHA-
insured and sold by HUD, nonprofits were able to obtain across-the-board, significant 
discounts on acquisition. In this new environment of subprime foreclosure with multiple 
actors involved, nonprofit organizations must develop relationships with a variety of in-
stitutions to structure programs to offer deep discounts or property donations. 
Successful deep discount or property donation programs can be created with cooperation 
from three main actors: financial institutions with a high loan volume that care about pro-
tecting the property values of the neighborhoods in which they do business: nonprofit or-
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ganizations with financial and technical capacity to rehab the properties; and city gov-
ernment that can provide subsidies to the buyer or developer to offset ‘appraisal gaps’ — 
the difference between the total cost of developing the property and the amount it can be 
sold for after rehab.  
Broadly, there are two options for properties backed by failed loans that do not get 
worked out: some become real estate owned (REO) and others are written off. REO 
properties are those that the servicer determines have sufficient economic value to make 
taking through the foreclosure process worthwhile. Write-offs are those that do not meet 
this standard. As the name suggests, walkaways are abandoned by both the borrower and 
the servicer/investor, who never takes title to the home to avoid incurring additional ex-
penses on a property with very low value. Walkaways are particularly likely to become 
sites for drug use and other crime, and at minimum are eyesores blighting neighborhoods 
as they decline.  
Nonprofit organizations can begin the dialogue by identifying target geographies in 
which they want to strategically acquire properties. Financial institutions are often willing 
to identify REO properties in those geographies that would make sense to discount or do-
nate to nonprofit organizations. In many cases, servicers take into account the increased 
cost they would incur by holding and marketing the property for a higher price as op-
posed to a quick but deeply discounted sale to a credible community-based developer. By 
showing success on a few properties — a thorough rehab and a timely sale to an owner 
occupant — nonprofit organizations can set the stage for an ongoing REO discount or 
donation program. 
Community-based developers and municipalities can also explore opportunities on 
‘write-off’ properties. These properties are determined to be of such low value that the 
cost of foreclosure exceeds any potential recoveries by the servicer. The servicer has 
made a well-researched decision to write off the loan rather than pursue foreclosure and 
subsequent title to the property. Because the financial institution has not completed the 
foreclosure, title cannot be transferred directly to the nonprofit. However, the interested 
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parties can explore partnerships in which the senior lien is assigned over to the nonprofit 
or municipality. This entity can pursue clear title by either initiating or completing the 
foreclosure action, or pursuing title through forfeiture or nuisance proceedings, according 
to the local ordinances of the municipality. These cases present a win for all involved: the 
servicer loses nothing, as the write-off strategy has already been determined as the best 
outcome; the nonprofit organization acquires a property for little or no money and can 
dedicate resources to substantial rehabilitation; and the municipality gets a code-
compliant building that remains on the tax rolls, rather than having to demolish the prop-
erty and pursue a re-use strategy for the vacant lot. Strategies around the transfer of writ-
ten-off properties should be explored and pursued as a way to deal with the most seri-
ously deteriorated properties.  
The Homeownership Preservation Initiative (HOPI) in Chicago is demonstrating that 
such a strategy can work. With a goal of reclaiming 300 vacant and foreclosed properties, 
Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago, working in cooperation with lender partners 
and the city of Chicago Department of Housing, will acquire 100 foreclosed single-
family buildings per year over three years, rehab them to safe and habitable condition, 
and sell the homes to low- and moderate-income families. Already, NHS has reclaimed 
39 properties through direct development or purchase-rehab lending from April 1 to Sep-
tember 30, 2003. NHS acquired 12 formerly vacant buildings for rehabilitation and sale, 
through donations or deep discounts from HUD as well as from Bank One, Citigroup, 
Chase, Household, and Washington Mutual. In addition, NHS and HUD are close to a 
final contract which will begin the second phase of the ‘Asset Control Area’ program, in 
which NHS will acquire all HUD properties at a substantial discount within a targeted 
area, rehab and sell them to owner occupants. This builds on the successful acquisition 
and sale of 100 vacant buildings through the first phase of the program. 
The efforts of NHS of Chicago demonstrate that rehabilitation funds coupled with 
lender/servicer discount or donation of properties can turn problem properties into com-
munity assets, but also indicates that doing so requires substantial capacity and commit-
ment of resources from public and private sources. For example, in 2001, the Los Ange-
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les City Council appropriated nearly $6 million to assist a major national nonprofit inter-
mediary in purchasing, rehabbing and selling a large portfolio of HUD-foreclosed proper-
ties. Given the many claims on public and philanthropic funds, such efforts must include 
clearly articulated rules governing the program criteria, including neighborhood and 
property characteristics as well as nonprofit status and capacity to ensure that these funds 
are targeted appropriately. Industry funds may also be available, either based on the 
charitable inclinations of mortgage companies, or the fact that helping to improve the 
disposition of foreclosed assets will forestall additional losses linked to the ‘contagion 
effect.’  
Reducing Neighborhood Impact Proposal 3: Develop a Queue of Loan-Ready Borrow-
ers. Unfortunately, many community-based organizations lack the needed rehabilitation 
resources to operate a HOPI-type initiative at any significant scale. In these circum-
stances, it may make sense to try to focus on homes that are less in need of major reha-
bilitation but that would still provide a good first-time buyer opportunity. Key here is to 
minimize the period in which homes are vacant and/or occupied by owners who no 
longer have an interest in preserving the home’s quality. Industry losses escalate dramati-
cally during the time when a borrower loses the capacity to save the loan and the date the 
servicer actually takes title to the home.  
Working cooperatively with concerned servicers, it would be possible to identify homes 
that are in reasonably good repair, but nevertheless are moving toward foreclosure. 
Rather than pursue the expensive foreclosure process, the servicers could offer the cur-
rent owner an opportunity for a preforeclosure sale to a loan-ready borrower identified by 
a neighborhood-based organization. One approach is for the servicer to offer a cash-for-
keys type of settlement that leaves the borrower something with which to start over, and 
then quickly resell the property to the loan-ready borrower. By minimizing the costs as-
sociated with foreclosure, such an approach could be beneficial to the servicer/investor, 
not to mention both the former and new homeowners. 
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Responsibility for producing and managing the borrower queue would lie with munici-
palities and counseling agencies. The city could maintain the lists from its CBO partners 
and handle arrangements between borrowers, servicers, and lenders. This oversight is in-
tended to make sure that the terms of the agreement to vacate the loan and those of the 
new loan are fair and consistent with city goals of fortifying neighborhoods against future 
decline. This could also include a requirement that homes sold through this process only 
go to prospective owner occupants.  
Such an approach could be particularly helpful in areas of rising — or even high but sta-
ble — property values where affordable homeownership opportunities are limited. In 
these situations, even potential homebuyers with access to subsidized financing may have 
difficulty finding an affordable property to purchase. By working closely with servicers, 
city and community groups help to make available for sale to lower-income borrowers at 
least a portion of the homes about to enter into foreclosure. Of course, extreme care must 
be exercised to insure that the new homeowner has the financial capacity to pay the 
mortgage as well as cover the costs of any subsequent rehabilitation issues that may arise. 
Similarly, it is important to make sure that these transactions are not completed at an in-
flated price that would inappropriately enrich the servicer or investor in the initial mort-
gage. Yet subject to these safeguards, such a program could add a useful new tool, espe-
cially in areas where homes are in better shape and property values are stable or on the 
rise.  
6.4 ENHANCING INDUSTRY RESPONSE CAPACITY 
The rise of subprime delinquencies and foreclosures has surprised many in the private 
sector, including investors, servicers, and the rating agencies. While investors and ser-
vicers obviously were aware of the potential for higher losses in the subprime sector, the 
magnitude of these potential losses was arguably not fully appreciated. Although credit 
enhancement shielded many investors from losses associated with faulty estimates of 
credit risks, even these investors may have suffered as unexpectedly high foreclosure 
rates have boosted prepayment speeds, exposing them to interest-rate risk, and under-
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mined their efforts to time income and liabilities. Moreover, credit enhancement does not 
fully shield investors from potential reputational damage associated with being the ulti-
mate (though distant) funder of a process in which low-income households are all too 
frequently overcharged or otherwise taken advantage of. The subprime industry and its 
investor base therefore have an incentive to improve understanding of default and loan 
failure from both a bottom-line perspective and reputational perspective. 
Industry Response Proposal 1: Summit on Foreclosure Avoidance. As noted through-
out this report, there are a number of reasons why foreclosures are damaging to various 
industry players. Most obviously, some investors in mortgage securities incur losses di-
rectly and/or may have to deal with investment issues caused by accelerated pre-
payments. Foreclosure also costs servicers dearly through the additional cost of taking 
loans through the foreclosure process.47 All legitimate subprime industry participants are 
vulnerable to negative publicity and perceptions of the industry. 
As a result, market participants could benefit from a series of ‘summits’ to discuss issues 
and outline workable solutions from an industry perspective. These summits would aid in 
information dispersal and work to overcome collective action problems. A first meeting 
would involve servicers and be designed to accelerate the dispersal of best practices and 
design strategies for mitigating the impact of ‘foreclosure contagion.’ A second meeting 
would educate investors about the process through which their insulation through credit 
enhancement allows origination problems to flourish and would motivate increased atten-
tion in the investor community to the monitoring and performance of originations, and 
the need for innovative strategies for reducing the number of foreclosures through loss-
mitigation efforts.  
These forums could be hosted by the Federal Reserve and SEC, perhaps in conjunction 
with Wall Street mortgage securities underwriters. Absent such collective action on the 
part of industry leaders, the existing allocational inefficiency that results from misaligned 
                                                 
47
 In some cases, depending on the nature of the servicing contract, the servicer might be paid more for 
dealing with problem loans, in which case losses to the trust are compounded. 
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incentives will persist, as will the inability of the industry to develop and implement a 
universal set of best practices for servicing, foreclosure avoidance, and neighborhood-
sensitive REO disposition.  
Industry Response Proposal 2: Increase Investor Accountability.
 Under today’s rules, 
investor responsibility for the actions of the various parties in the mortgage delivery 
chain is limited largely by the extent of their investment. In cases of outright fraud and 
abuse on the part of the mortgage broker or servicer, investors are shielded by the claim 
that they relied on the actions of others, and hence are not responsible for the actions of 
their agents. In such situations, this paper argues that by detaching investors from the 
consequences of important aspects of the mortgage system, an important feedback loop is 
broken, making the industry slow to route out abusive practices or respond to unexpected 
problems. 
Some have proposed shocking the system into change by altering the current environment 
with respect to assignee liability. As industry argues, making investors more accountable 
for the loans that they purchase would, in the short run, almost certainly make them less 
willing to participate in the market for subprime securities. Any decision on this issue 
should, however, also consider medium- and longer-term effects. While the flow of capi-
tal might initially slow down in some markets, the process could also drive the less effi-
cient and especially the less reputable players from the business, to the advantage of bor-
rowers and legitimate lenders alike. Enhanced investor accountability would ramp up 
demand for securities backed by loans originated using advanced risk-management tools 
and according to methods and systems that are more nearly immune to the still prevalent 
abuses of today. 
At present, industry representatives and community advocates are far apart on how best 
to balance consumer protection with industry interests.48 The OCC recently entered the 
                                                 
48
 Industry argues that such prohibitions reverberate through fragile neighborhoods in the form of dimin-
ished credit access (cf. Cowan 2003, Green 2003, Nadon 2003). Researchers and borrower advocates have 
responded with studies showing that in North Carolina, where anti–predatory-lending law has been on the 
books longest, there is little evidence of diminished access to legitimate nonprime mortgage credit and 
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fray, issuing a ruling that preempts the application of a wide range of state-level con-
sumer protection statutes for national banks (more than half of the U.S. banking indus-
try). This action has been controversial, however, and Senator Larry Craig, an Idaho Re-
publican, has taken the lead in challenging the validity OCC preemption of state statutes. 
At the time of this writing the likely solution to the preemption issue is unclear. 
Recognizing the complexity of this situation, additional research needs to be done on how 
to establish the proper balance between consumer protection and assignee liability. 
Moreover, there must be a concerted effort to push Congress to settle this dispute. In the 
end, it is the responsibility of Congress — not Wall Street or even federal regulators — to 
clearly articulate how best to balance the interest of consumers with the need to establish 
clear and enforceable accountability for abusive practices that harm low-income borrow-
ers and communities alike.  
Industry Response Proposal 3: Work with Rating Agencies to Improve Ratings Ra-
tionale. Absent a more substantial shift in rules governing investor accountability, rating 
agencies will continue to hold one of the most import ‘sticks’ with which to influence 
servicing practices via their published mortgage servicer ratings. Because these ratings 
ostensibly measure capacity to maintain cash flows smoothly when borrowers are paying 
on time and limit investor losses by helping borrowers out of trouble where possible, the 
rating of the servicer is one aspect that determines pricing and execution of a securities 
issue. All else being equal, lower servicer ratings translate into requirements for higher 
credit enhancement for a given pool (a factor that reduces issuer profitability) and/or into 
reduced liquidity of the issue. As a result, servicers work to maintain their ratings by 
demonstrating their innovativeness and effectiveness in loss mitigation and avoidance of 
costly foreclosures. 
                                                                                                                                                 
strong indications that predatory lending has been curtailed (Quercia, Stegman, and Davis 2003; Ernst, Far-
ris, and Stein 2002). Federal Reserve Board Governor Gramlich (2003) argued recently that subprime lend-
ing growth in North Carolina was slower than that of its neighbors following passage of the law, but noted 
that the there is no evidence on whether the difference between lending growth in North Carolina and its 
neighbors represents predatory lending that was stopped before it started or a diminution of access to le-
gitimate subprime credit. 
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In spite of these incentives, subprime servicer ratings have been correlated somewhat 
loosely with actual ability to sustain cash flows or with servicing acumen. The Fairbanks 
case, where servicing efforts collapsed while the company enjoyed a top servicer rating, 
is the most obvious example. Since Fairbanks’ problems became public, the each of three 
major rating agencies (Fitch, Moody’s and S&P) have taken pains to more accurately re-
flect the likely performance of individual servicer entities.  
Admittedly, this is a difficult task. In a major difference with rating the quality of servic-
ing in the prime market, there is limited historical data on the impact of alternative servic-
ing approaches on the overall performance of subprime loans. Simply stated, industry ex-
perts interviewed for this project differ on what constitutes the best approach to subprime 
servicing, if only because they disagree on the extent to which subprime borrowers differ 
from prime borrowers other than in obvious differences in income, wealth, and credit his-
tory. As a result, today there is no agreement as to whether a servicer that owns the entire 
residual interest in a securities issue is likely to be more effective than one holding only a 
portion of the risk, or no stake at all. Overall, ratings remain coarse, no doubt reflecting 
the fact that rating agencies recognize that differing approaches currently coexist in the 
marketplace and that no one has yet established a basis for determining which methods 
work best. 
In order to rectify this situation, the rating agencies must continue their efforts to gather 
data on loan performance and servicing activities. These data are essential for conducting 
rigorous tests of alternative servicing approaches and their impact on loss mitigation and 
foreclosure avoidance. Relatedly, the SEC has a role to play through its mandate to pro-
tect the interests of investors and ensure the proper functioning of the mortgage market. 
Absent the development of more sophisticated efforts to understand the effectiveness of 
alternative servicing strategies, the SEC must push the rating agencies to enhance their 
assessments, while at the same time helping them to assemble the data needed to accom-
plish this task.  
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Industry Response Proposal 4: Disseminate Best Practices in Servicing.
 A new fore-
closure model should also prioritize best practices in servicing and loss mitigation gener-
ally. Relative to the current situation, improvements could be made by expanding the 
share of companies committed to practices such as those published by Ameriquest 
(2003). In essence, these guidelines are a combination of two elements: proper operation 
of a servicing business and good corporate citizenship. Few, for instance, would mourn 
the loss of a business whose model was based in part on delaying the posting of payments 
in order to reap late fees from subprime borrowers. Similarly, while hazard insurance is 
necessary, force-placing inappropriate policies and collecting a fee from the insurer for 
doing so is the wrong way to go about it. Leaders in the industry may need to come to-
gether to develop best practices in order to place pressure on others by setting the stan-
dard for good practices.  
An additional and more challenging effort would see leading servicers participate in ef-
forts to help raise operational quality at companies that currently lag behind as a result of 
lack of resources or commitment. The market incentive for more technologically sophis-
ticated lenders to aide stragglers depends on if and how closely geographically concen-
trated foreclosures are causally linked. If it is true that foreclosure on a property reduces 
the salability of other homes and hence house-price appreciation on a block, neighboring 
borrowers will rationally place less stock in the importance of continuing to repay their 
loans. This downward spiral puts at risk even loans originated and serviced by forthright 
and reputable market participants.  
6.5 ENGINEERING FORECLOSURES OUT OF THE SYSTEM 
As discussed throughout this report, the subprime mortgage market is flawed in ways that 
do not appear amenable to self-correction. First, the market does not allocate credit effi-
ciently as defined by the criterion that equally qualified borrowers should pay the same 
price for credit. Second, it is characterized by principal-agent issues that impose unneces-
sary costs and/or siphon off surpluses that would normally accrue to borrowers or inves-
tors. Finally, the inability on the part of consumers to effectively shop the market pre-
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vents market forces from acting to drive prices lower in response to competitive pres-
sures. Fortunately, there is a growing awareness of the importance of providing better 
pricing information to potential borrowers.  
Virtually all of the interviewees mentioned the need for increased transparency. In its 
strategic plan for 2003 to 2007, Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation’s Neighbor-
Works® Campaign for Home Ownership emphasizes assisting borrowers to obtain better 
information on loan terms and prices. Improved transparency in the origination process 
would also help lower loan losses and reduce foreclosures. This would include increased 
efforts to help borrowers understand the risks of the mortgage up front. Though, as with 
all consumer purchases, the buyer must beware, in today’s market buyers are not able to 
be fully cognizant of the relevant product characteristics when the product is one as com-
plex and infrequently purchased as a mortgage. A first step would be to limit a bor-
rower’s ability to obtain a loan that he or she has no reasonable expectation of being able 
to repay, as attempted in several state-level anti–predatory-lending initiatives. A second 
step would be to help the borrower get the best loan terms for which he or she qualifies. 
Finally, escrowing of tax and insurance funds needs to become standard in the subprime 
market. 
Engineering Foreclosures Out Proposal 1: Enhance Consumers’ Capacity to Protect 
Themselves. One approach is to expand the capacity of CBOs to work with buyers indi-
vidually to search for the best mortgages.49 Of course, for such a service to be helpful, 
CBOs must have the track record and capacity to keep abreast of mortgage market trends 
for credit, and to be recognized by potential borrowers as a trusted source of information. 
Indeed, some CBOs are already gearing up to develop a mortgage brokerage business 
with the explicit goal of using their good standing in the neighborhood to become a 
                                                 
49
 Community-based organizations have to be mindful of the real or perceived conflict of interests inherent 
in assuming the role of ‘buyer’s broker.’ For example, to the extent that a particular CBO receives funding 
from a lending institution, it may feel pressured to recommend this institution’s products even in situations 
where more advantageous products exist in the marketplace. Needless to say, a CBO’s failure to provide 
proper safeguards to avoid conflicts of interest would quickly erode the trust that community residents have 
placed in the organization.  
 
Preserving Homeownership: Community-Development Implications of the New Mortgage Market 
 105 
‘buyer’s broker,’ while at the same time earning a small fee for offering this service. Like 
the trusted advisors available to many higher-income borrowers, a buyer’s broker would 
provide lower-income or less knowledgeable borrowers access to information on avail-
able mortgage terms and pricing. Like mortgage brokers, these buyer’s brokers would 
help borrowers qualify for and procure a loan but, unlike mortgage brokers, would work 
entirely on behalf of the borrower.  
To do this efficiently CBOs will need to acquire automated tools to evaluate the risk pro-
file of individual borrowers, and develop the capacity to identify the best products avail-
able in the market. Again, this goal is achievable, but challenging. Today, mortgage pric-
ing and terms are largely determined by credit history, income, and a limited number of 
other factors. Indeed, most brokers receive daily ‘rate sheets’ that specify the additional 
payments or terms required to compensate lenders for risk associated with a particular set 
of borrower/loan characteristics. Using software similar to that developed by large-scale 
mortgage originators or secondary-market players, CBOs could help address the current 
complexity that now works to the detriment of many borrowers. 
Fortunately, there are other ways, short of opening a full-scale mortgage brokerage opera-
tion, that CBOs can help borrowers search for better mortgages. Borrowing from the 
automobile blue books, CBOs could make ‘rate sheets’ available to recent graduates of 
homebuying courses or fairs. Armed with knowledge of their credit score, income, and 
other characteristics, these rate sheets could guide borrower efforts to shop for the most 
appropriate mortgage product and help them better evaluate unsolicited offers.  
Guttentag (2001) envisions another version of the buyer’s broker system in which for-
profit mortgage brokers agree to a fixed, up-front fee for using their expertise to shop for 
the best mortgage on the borrower’s behalf. Rather than have consumers rely on current 
mortgage brokers to provide them with accurate information, for a fee consumers could 
secure the services of a market professional who would be contractually and legally ac-
countable for finding them a loan on the best terms available in the marketplace. Such 
brokers are contractually bound to forfeit to the borrower any fees earned from the 
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lender, so the usual disincentive (i.e., principal-agent problem) to finding the borrower 
the best loan terms that he or she qualifies for does not apply.  
Finally, the potential importance of RESPA reform in simplifying the mortgage origina-
tion process cannot be overstated. Despite years of negotiating, today RESPA reform re-
mains controversial, and the recently proposed HUD RESPA regulation faces an uncer-
tain future. The question remains whether Congress, the Administration, the mortgage 
banking industry and other interested parties are willing to do the hard work needed to 
fashion a consensus proposal that will generate meaningful RESPA reform. 
Engineering Foreclosures Out Proposal 2: Provide Consumers with Better Informa-
tion.
 Basic economic theory suggests that markets work best when consumers make in-
formed choices concerning the goods and services they consume. Due to the complexity 
of the product and the difficulties inherent in shopping the marketplace, the subprime 
mortgage market is not characterized by these idealized competitive market conditions. In 
economic terms, there is an ‘information asymmetry’ between buyers and sellers, particu-
larly with respect to the price of mortgage credit. Mortgage industry professionals par-
ticipate in numerous transactions over the course of weeks and months and have ready 
access to information on the set of fees, rates, and terms that collectively determine ‘price 
of mortgage credit.’ In contrast, consumers only occasionally search for a loan to pur-
chase or refinance a home, and hence begin shopping for a loan with limited prior experi-
ence and equally limited access to the information needed to make an informed choice.  
Consumers, of course, could spend more time and money to better educate themselves 
about the price and terms of alternative mortgage products, but from the perspective of 
the efficient use of societal resources, it is probably not efficient for individual consumers 
to devote considerable resources to ferreting out information that is already known by 
mortgage originators. Yet as previously noted, often these originators have little incentive 
to provide detailed pricing information, particularly information that would enable a con-
sumer to compare prices of alternative products to determine whether they were being 
offered a loan on the best available terms.  
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These comments suggest that mortgage pricing information is in effect a public good, and 
that therefore there is a role for government in providing or encouraging the private pro-
vision of price information necessary to support the efficient operation of the mortgage 
market. While improved disclosure of the terms of the particular loan being offered to the 
consumer would help, as would continued consumer education efforts, these steps are not 
sufficient to achieve desired results. Federal regulators operating under applicable Fair 
Lending and Fair Trade authorities must expand their efforts to ensure that consumers 
obtain sufficient pricing information to make informed choices. This could take the form 
of a national registry of best available mortgage products, or other efforts to assist local 
government and community-based organizations help families to better understand the 
pricing of mortgage products as they relate to borrower income, credit score, and ability 
to meet down-payment and closing-cost requirements. Such readily available information 
— equivalent to the ‘blue books’ or consumer reports that have successfully guided 
shoppers for automobiles and other consumer durables — will both help consumers find 
the best available deal and better protect themselves from the adverse consequences of 
aggressive and/or deceptive marketing practices. Working to enable borrowers or their 
trusted advisors to be better shoppers and resist such marketing practices would go a long 
way not only in reducing the incidence of predatory lending, but also in stemming the 
growth of foreclosures that inevitably follows in the wake of these same predatory-
lending practices.  
Engineering Foreclosures Out Proposal 3: Make Escrow Standard. Although subprime 
borrowers are generally less equipped to withstand the ‘payment’ shock of lumpy annual 
payments such as property taxes or insurance, subprime mortgage contracts are far less 
likely to include provisions for escrow accounts than conforming mortgages. This is 
problematic because the fact that many borrowers are ill-prepared for these large pay-
ments when they arise can be the start of a steady slide into loan failure. Though escrows 
are common in the prime market, perversely, in subprime lending not including escrow 
provisions can be a source of competitive advantage as it makes monthly payment bur-
dens appear lower. Because most legitimate lenders have incentives to worry about per-
formance of the loan beyond the origination period, few object in principal to applying 
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escrow requirements broadly in order to eliminate any advantage to not including such 
provisions and to reduce the likelihood of loan failures. 
Engineering Foreclosures Out Proposal 4: Establish a National Center to Focus Atten-
tion on Foreclosure Avoidance. As noted throughout this report, there are numerous 
things that business, government, and the nonprofit sector can do to reduce both the inci-
dence of foreclosures and the costs associated with those foreclosures that do occur. To-
day, there are numerous national efforts to promote homebuyer education and to develop 
new mortgage products that better enable low-income and low-wealth borrowers to be-
come homeowners, and in doing so create a storehouse of equity that over the years can 
help them meet other financial needs. While these efforts, in combination with a rapidly 
changing mortgage market, have expanded access to credit to millions, they have also left 
a growing number of foreclosures in their wake. Having worked so hard to get families 
and individuals into homeownership in the first place, now would be a good time to 
launch an equally vigorous effort to preserve the homeownership gains that have been 
achieved. This could be accomplished by the creation of a new national foreclosure 
avoidance center to coordinate research, policy development, and implementation of a 
series of efforts to address the mounting foreclosure problem. 
Of course no single center working in isolation can address the totality of the growing 
foreclosure problem. But working in cooperation with other interested parties, this new 
foreclosure avoidance center could do much to focus attention on the problem and help to 
develop and disseminate creative solutions. For example, a national foreclosure avoid-
ance center could help build the national database needed to better understand the fore-
closure process. In addition, it could work with mortgage industry leaders to enhance the 
monitoring of those who continue to ‘push market’ borrowers into high-priced mortgages 
they can not afford and may not even need. It could also work with local governments 
and community-based organizations to create and disseminate best practices in foreclo-
sure avoidance. Finally it could work with federal, state, and local entities to create new 
and more effective laws and regulations concerning the mortgage industry in general, and 
foreclosure avoidance efforts in particular. Absence such an effort, for all too many 
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homeowners the dream of homeownership will deteriorate into the nightmare of foreclo-
sure.  
6.6 CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the most fundamental public-policy issue raised by the rise of foreclosures is 
whether, given their impact on borrowers, bottom lines, and neighborhoods, there is a 
socially unacceptable level of risk of mortgage failure and, if so, what that level is in dif-
ferent types of neighborhoods. The motivation for such policies would be twofold. First, 
from a ‘paternalistic’ perspective government may be justified in helping citizens avoid 
bad choices. This position underlies much of consumer protection law, for instance in the 
medical field where the FDA determines socially acceptable levels of risks associated 
with new medications. The second motivation for a policy circumscribing the ability to 
originate some types of loans is the negative external effects of foreclosures on every-
thing from neighbors to municipal budgets. Because the loan terms do not reflect the full 
social cost of foreclosure, very-high-risk subprime mortgages are underpriced. Either or 
both of these justifications could be used to support a federal determination of maximum 
failure tolerance standards in mortgage lending. 
Once appropriate thresholds were agreed upon (admittedly the hard part), implementing 
such a policy is relatively straightforward. If approved automated underwriting systems 
predicted a probability of failure for a given borrower that exceeded the threshold, the 
loan could not be made, even if it could be done ‘economically’ from the lender’s per-
spective. Short of such an outright ban, lenders might be required to identify all consum-
ers that presented foreclosure risks above the threshold, and refer them to certified credit 
counseling agencies in order to ensure that they fully understand the risks they confront 
and their loan alternatives. Before the borrower could be approved for the loan, the coun-
seling agency would have to certify that the consumer understood the extent of the risks 
associated with loan, had agreed to participate in regular postpurchase counseling ses-
sions, and that the loan reflected the best rates and terms available in the marketplace.  
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Going forward, the public policy challenge posed by the subprime mortgage industry is 
how to balance the need to continue to expand access to capital without exposing con-
sumers, neighborhoods, and investors to unacceptably high levels of risk. Any interven-
tion in the complex mortgage process must be mindful that well-intentioned but poorly 
executed interventions will needlessly circumscribe access to capital to many deserving 
borrowers. Achieving such a balance will not be easy. But whatever regulations emerge, 
it is important to bear in mind that the goal of expanding access to capital for low-income 
and low-wealth communities is not simply getting people into a home, but keeping them 
there. Helping them purchase a home that they can afford will not only improve their 
housing situation but will be key to building long-term assets in the process. A foreclosed 
home is the American Dream shattered. Now is the time to rethink how best to make 
homebuying a long-term benefit for individual consumers and communities alike, and not 
just the start of another costly cycle of deterioration and decline. 
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APPENDIX A: Homeownership Preservation Initiative  
Update on Accomplishments 
 
December 15, 2003 
 
Background 
The Homeownership Preservation Initiative (HOPI) is a partnership between the city of 
Chicago, Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago, and key lending, investment and 
servicing institutions doing business in Chicago. The partnership seeks to preserve home-
ownership whenever possible and keep families in their homes through counseling, loss 
mitigation and loan workouts. When foreclosure is unavoidable, the partners seek to pre-
serve the vacant properties as neighborhood assets. 
Three-Year Goals 
 
Homeownership Preservation: Help 1,500 homeowners avoid foreclosure 
#"Help 500 homeowners per year avoid foreclosure through loss mitigation ef-
forts, including loan workouts, refinancing, loan modifications, repayment 
plans and small loans to bring homeowners current on mortgage payments. 
Property Preservation: Reclaim 300 vacant, foreclosed properties 
#"NHS, through cooperation with lender partners and the Chicago Department 
of Housing, will acquire 100 foreclosed single-family buildings per year over 
three years, rehabilitate them to safe and habitable condition, and sell the 
homes to low- and moderate-income families.  
Homeownership Preservation 
The Department of Housing, NHS and HOPI partners are aggressively working to send 
the message to homeowners to seek help at the first sign of trouble, rather than waiting 
until foreclosure is a foregone conclusion. This message is being delivered through 
neighborhood-based outreach strategies and workshops, a new citywide 311 campaign, 
and postpurchase education. 
Neighborhood-based Outreach Strategies 
NHS, in partnership with HOPI lenders, continues to successfully implement its 
neighborhood-based outreach and counseling efforts to help homeowners in trou-
ble, including regular mailings to homeowners on the foreclosure lists provided 
by the National Training and Information Center (NTIC). Between April and Sep-
tember 2003, NHS counseled 372 clients at risk of foreclosure and was able to 
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achieve 186 successful outcomes — defined as any resolution of the situation that 
did not result in the property becoming vacant and abandoned. These successful 
outcomes resulted from NHS staff interventions with lenders, accessing private 
and public loan and grant resources (such as the Neighborhood Lending Program 
or Homeless Prevention Fund), or refinancing through NHS or a partner lender. 
This includes 47 loans to prevent foreclosure totaling $2.3 million. 
NHS, through its partnership with GMAC-RFC’s Homecomings Financial loan 
servicing unit, has enhanced its efforts to educate homeowners through a new 
“Homeowner’s Workshop.” In November 2003, NHS invited 1,000 Homecom-
ings Financial borrowers — ranging from current to in foreclosure — to a finan-
cial education workshop. The homeowners were provided with a free dinner and a 
gift certificate. They all lived in four NHS neighborhoods — Chicago Lawn, Au-
burn Gresham, West Englewood, and Back of the Yards — that have been hard-
hit by foreclosures. Forty-five homeowners learned about refinancing, financing 
home improvements, and how to avoid foreclosure.  
Homeowners in attendance who were having trouble with mortgage payments 
were encouraged to follow up with Homecomings Financial or NHS to work to-
ward a solution. Homecomings Financial plans to monitor these borrowers to de-
termine what impact the workshop has on loan performance. NHS and Homecom-
ings plan to host more workshops and will be seeking participation from other 
HOPI lenders. This type of hands-on activity at the local level has helped Home-
comings Financial exceed its best-case business plan by 50 percent in NHS 
neighborhoods during the first six months of establishing a local presence to keep 
more families in their homes. 
311 Homeownership Preservation Campaign 
The partners seek to expand efforts to reach homeowners at risk of foreclosure. 
The 311 Campaign will encourage homeowners to call the city’s non-emergency 
311 line at the first sign of mortgage delinquency. Callers will be connected with 
one of three credit counseling agencies affiliated with the Credit Counseling Re-
source Center for a free one-hour counseling session. The counseling agency will: 
#"Provide an in-depth assessment of the homeowner’s financial situation and 
an individual action plan; 
#"Serve as a liaison between the homeowner and the mortgage company, 
where appropriate, to advocate for a repayment plan, loan modification or 
other loss-mitigation strategy that will help the homeowner avoid foreclo-
sure; and 
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#"Provide referrals to NHS where the in-depth housing preservation, reha-
bilitation, and community-based services and resources can make a differ-
ence and to other local resources, where appropriate, for job training, tax 
assistance, and foreclosure-prevention classes.  
A pilot campaign will begin in late January 2004, with targeted mailings to home-
owners in zip codes with high rates of foreclosure. The pilot campaign will pro-
vide the opportunity to assess the response rate and ensure that referrals are oper-
ating smoothly. A more broad-based outreach strategy through local alderman’s 
offices, schools, churches, libraries and community-based institutions is planned 
for late February. 
Postpurchase Education 
The Department of Housing will be working with NHS and other housing coun-
seling agencies to deliver a Postpurchase Education Curriculum. The series of 
classes will focus on a variety of postpurchase issues, including home mainte-
nance, taxes and insurance, budgeting and credit, home improvement, and refi-
nancing. A key message will be how to avoid getting into financial trouble that 
could lead to foreclosure, and what to do if you are behind in your mortgage. 
Classes will be offered in various communities throughout the city. 
Reclaiming Vacant Buildings 
When foreclosure is unavoidable, the partnership seeks to reclaim the building for 
affordable homeownership. NHS, DOH and HOPI partners have been working on 
innovative ways to transfer ownership of troubled, single-family buildings to 
NHS or other responsible developers.  
Acquisition and Rehabilitation of Vacant Buildings 
NHS reclaimed 39 properties through direct development or purchase-rehab lend-
ing during April 1 to September 30, 2003. NHS acquired 12 formerly vacant 
buildings for rehabilitation and sale, through donations or deep discounts from fi-
nancial partners or through HUD. To date, NHS has received donations or deep 
discounts of properties from Bank One, Citigroup, Chase, Household, and Wash-
ington Mutual.  
HUD Asset Control Area Program 
NHS and HUD are close to a final contract which will begin the second phase of 
the “Asset Control Area” program, in which NHS will acquire all HUD properties 
at a substantial discount within a targeted area, and will rehab and sell them to 
owner occupants. This builds on the successful acquisition and sale of 100 vacant 
buildings through the first phase of the HUD ACA program. 
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Appraisal Gap Subsidy 
The Department of Housing has included funding in its 2004 budget to assist 
NHS and other nonprofits in rehabbing vacant buildings. This subsidy ensures 
that vacant, deteriorated properties can be rehabbed to safe and marketable condi-
tion for homeownership. 
Community Development Best Practices 
As a result of the Homeownership Preservation Initiative, Chicago is the subject of a na-
tional research project sponsored by Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation and NHS 
of Chicago and conducted by independent consultant Mark Duda and William Apgar, 
Senior Scholar at Harvard’s Joint Center for Housing Studies. The objectives of the re-
search are: 
#"To better understand investment securities, servicing agreements and other finan-
cial structures; 
#"To better understand the industry’s assumptions, chart the institutional and legal 
relationships, and test how each stakeholder in the process operates and how this 
affects low- and moderate-income markets; 
#"To diagnose issues and create innovative partnership solutions around tools, 
strategies, and business models that serve to better manage the mortgage delin-
quencies and foreclosures experienced by low- and moderate-income neighbor-
hoods. 
The report is expected to be complete in March 2004. 
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